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I. INTRODUCTION
The process of confirming federal judges is in large part a political
affair, and so opinions regarding the health of the confirmation pro-
cess tend to differ in predictably partisan ways. With a Republican
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president in the White House, Republicans complain about Demo-
cratic obstruction of nominations and urge reforms that would stream-
line what they regard as a broken process.' Democrats, in contrast,
point out that the vast majority of President Bush's nominees have
been confirmed and contend that the process is working just fine or, at
least, much more smoothly and fairly than it did for President Clin-
ton's nominees. During the Clinton years, of course, Democrats railed
against alleged Republican abuses and proposed reforms not unlike
those now favored by Republicans.
It may be that all of the turmoil over judicial confirmations is sim-
ply ordinary politics at work. If a Democrat wins the 2008 election,
the roles will reverse once again, there will be recriminations and
counter-recriminations over alleged obstructionism, some nomina-
tions will be held up, but the Republic will surely get along just fine.
The appointments process is to some degree engineered to produce
conflict, and one should be wary of those who contend that things are
uniquely more politicized and turbulent now than they have been in
the past.2
All the same, many respectable institutional players with long-
term interests that transcend transient partisan advantage really do
seem to believe that something has gone seriously awry. 3 If one tries
to abstract away from one's own partisan feelings and (at the risk of
quaintness) adopt a good-government, commonweal-regarding per-
spective on the matter, one might well be sympathetic to the idea that
things can be and ought to be better. This Article, however, will re-
main agnostic on the question whether reform is, all things consid-
1. See John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for
Filibuster Reform, 27 HAIv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 206-18 (2003).
2. For a reminder of the need to maintain some historical perspective on the confir-
mation process, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS,
at xvi-xix (2003). See also CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CON-
GRESS COLLIDE 171-222 (2006) (summarizing history of Senate efforts to control
judicial behavior through the confirmation process).
3. For instance, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist repeatedly raised the issue of ex-
cessive judicial vacancies during administrations of both parties, notably in his
1997, 2001, and 2002 Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary. See William H.
Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD
BRANCH, Jan. 1998, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan98ttb/anuary.
htm; William H. Rehnquist, 2001 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THE
THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 2002, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/an02ttb/jan
02.html; William H. Rehnquist, The 2002 Year-End Report on the Federal Judici-
ary, THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 2003, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan
03ttb/jan03.html. Likewise, the American Bar Association, despite some conten-
tions that it plays the role of a liberal interest group in the appointments process,
passed a resolution urging speedier consideration of President Bush's nominees.
See American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improve-
ments, Resolution on Existing Judicial Vacancies (Aug. 2002), http://www.aba
net.org/scfji/resolutions.html#vacancies.
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ered, a desirable thing, and it will not delve into the extensive debate
over precisely what substantive reforms would be appropriate. This
Article aims instead to examine the relatively neglected issue of the
vehicle through which reform might take place-that is, the method of
implementing whatever reform, if any, is thought desirable.
In particular, this Article will take up the question whether it
would be proper to reform the confirmation process not through the
vehicles that are most frequently proposed-a constitutional amend-
ment, an amendment to internal Senate rules, an informal "deal" or
norm-but instead through the mechanism of a statute. Although
statutory reform has not yet been subjected to any significant legal
analysis, a growing number of commentators have proposed using the
statutory method, and legislation has been introduced in the past.4 A
statute regulating confirmations could take a number of different
forms depending upon what particular substantive reforms were
thought best (or were capable of winning passage at a given time).
The statute could, for instance, bar filibusters of judicial nominees,
thus addressing the Republicans' chief complaint of late. It could
mandate that committee hearings be held and committee votes be
scheduled within a fixed period of time after the president submits a
4. In a recent article, two authors-one a former federal judge whose nomination to
the court of appeals was filibustered-propose the codification of confirmation
procedures. See Charles W. Pickering, Sr. & Bradley S. Clanton, A Proposal:
Codification by Statute of the Judicial Confirmations Process, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 807 (2006). They do not, however, engage in any sustained legal
analysis of whether a statutory approach would be permissible. See id. at 816
n.57. Other commentators have mentioned the possibility of a statute addressing
certain aspects of the confirmations process but likewise have not explored the
constitutional issues such an approach would raise. See, e.g., Sarah A. Binder &
Thomas E. Mann, Slaying the Dinosaur: The Case for Reforming the Senate Fili-
buster, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1995, at 42 (proposing statutory limits on de-
bate over nominees); Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation
Process: Replacing "Despise and Resent" with "Advice and Consent," 53 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1, 35 n.147 (2001) (suggesting a statute that would require automatic dis-
charges of nominations if the Judiciary Committee fails to schedule a vote); Cal-
vin R. Massey, Getting There: A Brief History of the Politics of Supreme Court
Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 14 (1991) (discussing a proposal for a
statute that would require a two-thirds vote to confirm nominees); Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, Taking Advice Seriously: An Immodest Proposal for Reforming the Con-
firmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1577, 1580-81 (1992) (proposing a statute
that would give nominees expedited treatment if the president selected the nomi-
nee from a list created by the Senate). A related but distinct topic is statutory
qualifications for office, such as anti-nepotism statutes. See generally Donald J.
Kochan, The Unconstitutionality of Class-Based Statutory Limitations on Presi-
dential Nominations: Can a Man Head the Women's Bureau at the Department of
Labor?, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 43 (2005); Michael E. Solimine, Nepotism in the Fed-
eral Judiciary, 71 U. CiN. L. REV. 563 (2002); Richard P. Wulwick & Frank J.
Macchiarola, Congressional Interference with the President's Power to Appoint, 24
STETSON L. REV. 625 (1995). Past legislative proposals are discussed infra section
II.B.
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nomination, thus addressing some of the principal Republican delay
tactics during the Clinton presidency. Although the above measures
would generally benefit the president, a pro-executive tilt is not a nec-
essary feature of a statutory reform. A more balanced statute could
limit the special expedited procedures to cases in which the president
picks a nominee from a list provided by the Senate. If a supermajority
confirmation rule were thought desirable for policy or political rea-
sons, the statute could set the threshold for cloture at sixty-five (or at
fifty-five, or whatever figure one prefers),5 thus attempting to pre-
serve the supermajoritarian consensus-based process in the face of the
so-called "nuclear option."6 The statute might apply to Supreme
Court vacancies, lower court openings, or both. The important point
for this analysis is not what exactly the statute would provide but that
the reforms would be set forth in statutory form.
Although proposals for a statute regulating Senate voting rules
might at first seem to trespass into the realm of internal Senate pre-
rogatives, this type of statute would not be unprecedented. In fact,
similar statutory frameworks governing rules of debate exist in a
number of areas, ranging from federal budget mechanisms to the mili-
tary base closure process. 7 Such statutes have become more prevalent
in recent times, and they have also started to draw increased scholarly
5. A statute that attempted to set a supermajority requirement would raise addi-
tional constitutional questions beyond those discussed here, namely whether
Congress can create supermajority requirements in situations where the Consti-
tution arguably contemplates majority approval.
6. The "nuclear option" (or "constitutional option") is a method whereby the Senate
majority would circumvent the usual burdensome process for changing the Sen-
ate's rules by instead seeking and ratifying a ruling from the presiding officer
that the filibuster could be eliminated by a simple majority vote.
7. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 631-645a (2000) (congressional budget process); id.
§§ 658d-658e (legislation containing unfunded mandates); 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2000)
(procedures for legislation that nullifies agency regulations); id. §§ 901-912 (2000
& Supp. 2006) (executive reorganization plans); 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(h) (2000) (Sen-
ate rules for legislation adjusting the status of certain aliens); 15 U.S.C. § 719f
(2000) (procedures for approving presidential determinations concerning Alaskan
natural gas pipelines); 16 U.S.C. § 1823 (2000) (procedures for disapproving in-
ternational fisheries agreements); 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (fast
track for trade agreements); 29 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2000) (procedures for consider-
ing Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation premium revisions); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(i) (2000) (procedures for nuclear accident compensation legislation); id.
§ 6249c (legislation implementing certain petroleum contracts); 50 U.S.C. § 1622
(2000) (procedures for terminating presidentially declared states of emergency);
War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 6 (1973) (procedures for bills and
joint resolutions regarding use of armed forces); see also CONSTITUTION, JEFFER-
SON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No.
108-241, at 1057-231 (2005) [hereinafter JEFFERSON'S MANUAL] (providing text of
over thirty statutes that create special streamlined procedures for considering
resolutions disapproving of executive actions).
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interest.8 But while mostly a modern phenomenon, they are assur-
edly not novel. Their history in this country arguably stretches back
to 1789, to the first Congress under the new Constitution. Indeed, the
first statute in the Statutes at Large is a statute governing the order of
business at the beginning of each new Congress, a matter that could
have been (and in fact is) regulated through the internal rules of each
chamber. 9 Probably the most familiar of this genre of procedural stat-
utes is the "fast track" framework governing congressional approval of
trade agreements. Under fast track, the president submits a bill im-
plementing a newly negotiated trade agreement for congressional ap-
proval under special streamlined procedures set forth by statute. A
judicial confirmations statute would essentially bring this existing
method into a new substantive area.
Is a statute a permissible method of reform in this context? The
Constitution provides, in a mostly unappreciated clause, that "[elach
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings."lo That is, each
chamber may act by itself to govern its own proceedings. Using this
authority, both chambers have promulgated standing rules through
one-house resolutions, and each house typically governs itself free
8. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrench-
ment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL.
345 (2003); Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CON-
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717 (2005) [hereinafter Garrett, Purposes]; Charles Tiefer,
How to Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws About Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. &
POL. 409 (2001); Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Pro-
cedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 427-31 (2004); Elizabeth Garrett, Conditions for
Framework Legislation, in THE LEAST ExAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLA-
TURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds.
2006) [hereinafter Garrett, Conditions]. Garrett's term "framework legislation"
concerns statutes that establish procedures to govern the consideration of certain
types of legislation or decisions; framework legislation includes fast track proce-
dures for trade agreements and statutes shaping the budget process, for instance.
Garrett, Purposes, supra, at 718-19. My 2003 article used the term "statutized
rules," which denotes a larger category that includes all statutes that regulate
matters that could be governed by internal rules of debate; the category of"statu-
tized rules" would include, among other things, statutes that structure the com-
mittee system, as well as framework legislation such as fast track. Bruhl, supra,
at 346-47. The judicial confirmations statute discussed here is both a statutized
rule and a framework law, and this Article employs both terms.
9. Act of June 1, 1789, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 23. In particular, the statute described the
procedures through which oaths of office were to be administered to members and
officers at the beginning of each new Congress and provided that this should be
done "previous to entering on any other business." Id. §§ 2, 4, 1 Stat. at 23-24.
The rules of the House and Senate both currently contain provisions also regulat-
ing the taking of oaths at the beginning of each session. SEN. RULE III; H.R. RULE
11. 1. This statute is better known for the section setting forth oaths for state offi-
cials, which generated some controversy. See David P. Currie, The Constitution
in Congress: The First Congress and the Structure of Government, 1789-1791, 2
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 170-71 (1995).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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from the control of the other house or any other branch of government.
Does the existence of this unilateral power over the rules of proceed-
ings mean that Congress cannot pass a statute that regulates the Sen-
ate's parliamentary procedures for considering a nomination? Stated
differently, is the Rules of Proceedings Clause not merely a permission
to act unilaterally-"[e] ach House may"-but also an implicit com-
mand that the chambers not govern their proceedings through a stat-
ute, even if the statute is otherwise within Congress' broad Article I
legislative powers? If Congress passes rules in statutory form, would
each house nonetheless retain the power to nullify portions of the
United States Code by abrogating those statutized rules unilaterally?
But if so, how could that result be squared with the legislative veto
case of INS v. Chadha,11 which seems to teach that only a statute, and
not unilateral action, can undo a statute? Statutized rules are rather
mysterious, existing on the still-not-completely-charter border be-
tween statutes and rules. They govern parliamentary procedure or or-
ganization-the stuff of rules-and yet they are statutes enacted into
the United States Code. Part of their attraction is that they are some-
thing more than "just" rules, and yet legislators have treated them as
something less binding than a normal statute. Statutized rules raise
fundamental questions regarding separation of powers, entrench-
ment, and the distinction between statutes and other modes of legisla-
tive activity.
Although statutized rules exist in a number of policy areas, and
therefore much of what is said in this Article is generally applicable,
the confirmation process does have three distinctive features that re-
quire a modified analysis.12 First, unlike most subjects for framework
laws, the process of confirming judges requires the consent of the Sen-
ate alone, not bicameral approval. This means that the analysis of
potential defects in the confirmations statute must focus more on cam-
eral autonomy rather than on Congress-versus-executive dynamics
(though the latter is still very important). Second, the appointments
process described in Article II of the Constitution gives the president
"the power to propose," which is a reversal from the usual Article I,
Section 7 legislative process under which Congress first proposes a
policy and the president can only accept it or veto it. Because the Con-
stitution already gives the president this structural advantage in ap-
pointments, it is difficult to condemn a confirmations statute on the
grounds that it grants the president too much control over outcomes-
a charge that has more traction with regard to statutory regimes that
govern the consideration of ordinary legislation. Thus, the analysis of
the confirmations statute will highlight the fact that the key difficulty
11. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
12. For previous research addressing the legal status of framework laws in the ordi-
nary legislative process, see Bruhl, supra note 8.
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(if there is one) with statutized rules is not that they change policy
outcomes to the president's advantage but that they invite other
agents to play a role in a chamber's internal affairs. Third, under cur-
rent Senate practice, the Senate's rules are already quite difficult to
change, which tends to deflate an argument that a confirmations stat-
ute impermissibly attempts to tie the hands of future legislators. In-
deed, given the ossification of the Senate's rules, using statutes might
even be better from the point of view of the anti-entrenchment norm.
The analysis in this Article includes discussion of both the practi-
calities of a confirmations statute and the legalities of it, and it pro-
ceeds as follows. Part II of the Article lays some necessary
groundwork for the legal analysis by describing the possible confirma-
tions statute in somewhat greater detail. It also explains why legisla-
tors might decide to enact the statute and notes that a statutory
reform could be easier to achieve than a change to the Senate's parlia-
mentary rules.
The next three Parts of the Article then consider a series of poten-
tial legal problems with a confirmations statute. Many observers, not
to mention the House and Senate themselves, regard statutized rules
as constitutionally problematic, and we will consider whether that
concern is warranted. Part III asks whether Congress even has the
authority to pass the statute at all. That is, leaving aside whether the
statute is invalid because it conflicts with some constitutional prohibi-
tion, what enumerated power or other provision of the Constitution
gives Congress the power to pass a statute governing rules of debate
in the first place? Part III concludes that Congress does indeed have
the prima facie authority to pass such a statute, either as an exercise
of the rules power or (less controversially) under the Appointments
Clause. Part IV then considers the argument that the statute cannot
be binding because it would run afoul of the anti-entrenchment rule,
which holds that one legislature cannot bind its successors. Although
the anti-entrenchment rule forms the basis for the usual criticism of
framework laws, I conclude that the rule does not adequately explain
what (if anything) is wrong with a confirmations statute. Therefore,
in Part V, I turn to what I believe to be the most satisfying account of
the statute's constitutional infirmities. Namely, I argue that the
Rules of Proceedings Clause should be read through the lens of a prin-
ciple of cameral autonomy over procedure, distilled from various tex-
tual and structural considerations, that invests the Rules of
Proceedings Clause with meaning beyond what its quotidian exterior
suggests. This principle of procedural autonomy holds that neither
the president nor the other house of Congress can subject either cham-
ber to the indignity of being stripped of control over its internal gov-
ernance. For this reason a confirmations statute could not be binding
966 [Vol. 85:960
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in the way that statutes characteristically bind, but instead the Sen-
ate would retain the power to change its rules unilaterally.
Legally binding force is not the only thing that matters, however.
Thus, ending by returning to a more practical note, Part VI explains
how a confirmations statute might work in practice even if it is not
formally binding, just as many other statutized rules have had quite
effective careers. It might therefore have practical and political value
to reformers despite its limitations and complications.
II. SOME DETAILS ABOUT THE CONFIRMATIONS STATUTE
While most proposals for reforming the confirmation process do not
contemplate statutory solutions, a few commentators have proposed
such an approach, 13 and legislators have on several occasions intro-
duced legislation that would regulate judicial confirmations.14 This
Part of the Article lays some groundwork for the legal analysis of such
proposals.15 It begins by briefly addressing how such a statute might
come into being-that is, how and why Congress might enact such a
statute. This Part then describes the hypothetical judicial confirma-
tions statute in somewhat greater detail, using past proposals for stat-
utes structuring the confirmation process as a point of departure.
Assuming for the time being that the statute is constitutionally per-
missible, this Part next tentatively addresses some practical questions
regarding whether and how such a statute would work. Many readers
will be inclined to suspect that if Congress passed such a statute, it
would be only symbolic and could not actually affect the conduct of
future confirmation battles. While deferring a fuller analysis to Part
VI, I will suggest that the reality is more complicated. It is unlikely
that the statutory regime could be judicially enforceable, but even if
not, it could have a great deal of power as a practical and political
matter.
A. Why and How Would Such a Statute Be Enacted?
Commitment Versus Mere Opportunism
Although the main point of this Article is to explore the legal issues
surrounding the validity of a confirmations statute, it is worth briefly
considering first whether such a statute would or could ever be en-
acted. Why would Congress want to pass the statute?16
13. See supra note 4.
14. Past legislative proposals are discussed infra section II.B.
15. Readers interested only in the purely legal questions may of course skip ahead to
Part III.
16. Professor Garrett, in her effort to provide a general treatment of the purposes of
framework laws, has identified five leading purposes: (1) symbolism, (2) provid-
ing neutral rules, (3) coordination, (4) entrenchment/precommitment, and (5)
shifting the intrabranch balance of power. See Garrett, Purposes, supra note 8.
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Here there are two main types of approaches to explaining the mo-
tives behind the statute, one rather optimistic and one quite cynical.
The more cheery version could be called the "commitment rationale."
On this approach, Congress would conclude that the judicial confirma-
tions process has become trapped in a form of long-term prisoner's di-
lemma.17 It is generally to the immediate political advantage of the
party that does not control the White House to attempt to bog down
and block the president's nominees. (This is true whether the opposi-
tion party is in the majority in the Senate or in the minority.) When
the opposition party eventually takes the White House, the tables will
turn and its president will suffer the same obstructions earlier visited
upon the other party's president. All sides might rationally believe
that things would be better for everyone if neither side engaged in
obstruction, giving the president more control over appointments.
They might hold such a preference for any number of reasons, such as
because they highly value the ability of their president to make
strongly partisan appointments that please their political base or sim-
ply because they think it is bad for the country when numerous judge-
ships go unfilled.18 In any event, the bottom line is that each side
would be willing to give up some of its ability to block an opposing
president's nominees if that would mean its president would get the
same treatment. But, crucially, since there is currently no way to
make a credible pledge to abide by such a deal, each side engages in
obstruction.
Confirmations reform could be regarded as a solution to this pris-
oner's dilemma. By preventing each side from engaging in short-term
opportunism, it would allow both sides to achieve what they regard as
a better outcome. But what advantage does a statute hold in particu-
lar? There are several potential benefits. To begin with, statutes are
generally perceived (rightly or wrongly) as more forceful and
mandatory than parliamentary rules, which are purely creatures of
the relevant house and can be changed or ignored at its sole whim. A
durable statute would offer neutral and evenhanded benefits inas-
much as the same rules would apply to future vacancies regardless of
As the discussion below will show, a confirmations statute could have multiple
motivations and arguably could fit within several of Garrett's categories.
17. For work modeling the current appointments situation in game theoretic terms,
see, for example, David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the
Senate, and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479 (2005); and David S.
Law & Sanford Levinson, Why Nuclear Disarmament May Be Easier to Achieve
Than an End to Partisan Conflict Over Judicial Appointments, 39 U. RICH. L.
REV. 923 (2005).
18. Cf Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Congress and the Politics of Judicial
Appointments, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 314 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 8th ed. 2005) (presenting statistics showing relationship be-
tween vacant appellate judgeships and delayed disposition of cases).
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the partisan configuration of government.19 The neutrality could be
enhanced further if the statute's effective date were delayed until af-
ter the next presidential election, so that the enacting legislature
would not know whom they were benefiting. 20 Further, a statute
rather than a rule would be an appropriate choice if Congress wished
or needed to enact the rule changes as part of package with other mat-
ters that could only be done through legislation. 2 1 A statutory solu-
tion may well be regarded as more democratically legitimate than
other arrangements, such as the deal under which the fate of the fili-
buster was put in the hands of fourteen senators who were the sole
arbiters of what would constitute "extraordinary circumstances" that
would justify a filibuster.22 There is perhaps something unseemly
about a small, self-selected group of fourteen senators making such
consequential decisions about the rules for considering nominations. 2 3
The judicial fast track statute, in contrast, would be the product of the
normal Article I, Section 7 process, bringing together both houses of
Congress and the president to make national policy on a matter of
national concern. Finally, strictly from the point of view of political
practicalities, the statute might be easier to enact than a change to the
Senate's ossified standing rules, which are protected by a filibuster
rule even more supermajoritarian than the filibuster rules that govern
the process of enacting legislation. 24
It is hard to say whether, as the commitment rationale supposes,
the players really find themselves in a prisoners' dilemma. It is just
19. See Pickering & Clanton, supra note 4, at 809 (citing this as a benefit of employ-
ing a statute). Whether a statute really is, or constitutionally could be, more
binding than a rule is of course one of the main questions this Article addresses.
20. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
21. See Garrett, Conditions, supra note 8, at 312-17 (listing the need to change par-
liamentary rules as part of a simultaneous package as a factor leading to frame-
work laws).
22. In May 2005, striking a bargain that averted a confrontation over the legality of
the filibuster of judicial nominees, a group of seven Democrats and seven Repub-
licans agreed that the Republicans would drop their plan to eliminate the filibus-
ter via the "nuclear option" in exchange for the Democrats' promise to reserve the
filibuster for "extraordinary circumstances." See Robert Byrd et al., Memoran-
dum of Understanding on Judicial Nominations (May 23, 2005), available at
http://www.cspan.org/pdf/senatecompromise.pdf; Carl Hulse, Bipartisan Group
in Senate Averts Judge Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at Al.
23. Cf. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Judicial Filibuster, the Me-
dian Senator, and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 2005 Sup. CT. REV. 257,
292-93, 292 n.90 (arguing that an open and explicit agreement on a super-
majority rule would have greater legitimacy than either the current system of
questionable filibusters or the deal reached by the Gang of Fourteen).
24. The short explanation is that sixty votes are needed to end debate on ordinary
legislation, but ending debate on a proposal to change the rules requires two-
thirds of those present and voting. The issue of the relative difficulties of enact-
ing a statute versus changing the Senate rules is taken up in greater detail infra
section V.A.
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as plausible that, despite their protestations, each side prefers the
conflict and turmoil (perhaps because it provides good fodder for fun-
draising appeals). Or it may be that each side values the ability to
block the other side's truly unacceptable nominees more than it values
the ability to push through its own most preferred nominees. It is also
certainly possible that preferences differ with regard to different types
of appointments: All sides might desire less obstruction for lower court
nominees but fear giving the president too free a hand with more con-
sequential Supreme Court appointments. To be sure, any statute that
erodes senators' powers over nominations will face an uphill battle,
but given the right proposal and a sufficiently dire assessment of the
health of the confirmation process, the good-government impulse to
reform could begin to overcome senators' desires to preserve their
privileges, especially as regards lower court judges. Moreover, by us-
ing the statutory form, the change to the confirmation procedures
could be bundled together with other legislative initiatives in order to
maximize the chances of enactment.
In all events, even if the commitment rationale were insufficient to
bring about a confirmations statute, there is a second, less principled
way the statute could come to pass. It is fairly easy to imagine a con-
firmations statute being enacted simply on the basis of short-term
partisan advantage. For example, a statute streamlining the process
could be passed when, as was the case for much of President Bush's
presidency, the White House and the Congress are controlled by the
same party. The majority party could introduce a statute abolishing
the filibuster for judicial nominees and win passage in both houses on
a party-line vote. In the Senate, the minority could threaten to filibus-
ter the confirmations statute, but the filibuster could be made much
more costly if the majority bundled the statute with must-pass legisla-
tion-for example, under the previous Republican majority, this could
have been an Iraq War supplemental spending bill (which the major-
ity would champion with cries of "Support the Troops!") or the requi-
site biennial child pornography omnibus crime bill ("Get Tough on
Pedophiles!"). Only a few minority senators would need to buckle for
cloture to succeed. With the confirmation statute on the books, the
president could nominate highly partisan nominees who otherwise
would be filibustered, and the Senate majority would rely on the stat-
ute as a justification for circumventing the filibuster, whether or not
the confirmations statute is really binding. The minority party could
return this treatment if they captured the Senate and the presidency,
but the party in power might regard that future risk as worth it given
the immediate gain, especially if multiple Supreme Court vacancies
were at stake.
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Having explored these two scenarios for how a confirmations stat-
ute could come to be, let us now examine how the statute would func-
tion in somewhat greater detail.
B. Key Components of the Statute
As indicated earlier, there are a great many statutized rules scat-
tered about the United States Code, and they have a long history.
And although no judicial confirmations statute has been enacted, pro-
posals have been made on several occasions, during both Republican
and Democratic administrations. 25 The proposals generally parallel
the time-tested fast track procedures governing trade agreements,
which allow the president to present a bill implementing a newly ne-
gotiated trade agreement for congressional approval under special
streamlined procedures that, among other things, provide strict time-
tables for holding votes and bar filibusters.26
Following in the footsteps of the fast track statute and the previous
proposals, our theoretical judicial confirmations statute would have
two key components. First, to circumvent committee delay, it would
provide some time period after which a nomination would automati-
cally come out of the Judiciary Committee onto the full Senate's execu-
tive calendar, such as through the fast track statute's "automatic
discharge" procedure. 27 Second, it would include a mechanism for en-
suring a timely vote by the full Senate. This could take the form of an
explicit provision calling for majority cloture, though the same effect
could be achieved through a requirement that an up-or-down vote be
held after some prescribed time period. 28
These two features of the judicial confirmations statute would ad-
dress the key obstacles that reformers have targeted. No longer could
the majority party silently kill or delay nominations by refusing to
schedule hearings and votes, as the Republicans did in the case of
some of President Clinton's nominees. Nor could the minority filibus-
ter, or threaten to filibuster, candidates that enjoyed majority sup-
port, as happened to some of President Bush's nominees. Just as
25. See, e.g., S. 1906, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 2371, 102d Cong. (1991); S. 910, 102d
Cong. (1991); see also 144 CONG. REC. 10,997 (1998) (describing amendments
3658 and 3659 to S. 2176, which proposed that nominations pending before a
committee for more than 150 days be discharged from the committee and deemed
reported favorably, and that nominations remaining on the Senate executive cal-
endar for more than 150 days be voted on within five days).
26. For detailed accounts of fast track, see, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, The
Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143 (1992); and
Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements, 5
FLA. INT'L L. J. 471 (1990).
27. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(e)(1)-(2) (2000).
28. See id. § 2191(e) (requiring floor vote on trade agreements within fifteen days of
the legislation being reported); id. § 2191(g) (limiting length of floor debate).
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important, no more could obstreperous senators of either party single-
handedly frustrate nominations through anonymous holds.29
While the features above are the crucial ones for purposes of the
legal analysis set forth in this Article, it is worth noting that a judicial
fast track statute could certainly add other features as well. Taking a
cue from the fast track trade regime, which conditions its expedited
procedures on the president's first having consulted with Congress
about the content of the trade agreement, 30 the confirmations statute
might confer its special expedited timetables only when the president
first actively seeks the Senate's advice on potential nominees. 3 1 Since
judicial fast track represents a substantial increase in the president's
ability to have his way, it seems only fair that Congress should exact
some compensation in return. By offering benefits to both branches,
such proposals might also increase the odds that the statute would
pass.
Another embellishment would be to give the new regime a delayed
effective date-it would not begin to operate until, say, 2009.32 Post-
poning the effective date until after the next presidential election
would randomize the statute's benefits. Legislators would in effect be
acting from behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. 3 3
29. Stated briefly, the anonymous hold allows senators to delay consideration of a
nomination while they give it further "study." See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at
140-43. The related blue-slip procedure permits senators from the nominee's
state to (sometimes) block a nomination altogether. See Brannon P. Denning,
The Judicial Confirmation Process and the Blue Slip, 85 JUDICATURE 218 (2002).
30. See 19 U.S.C. § 2112(c)-(e) (2000).
31. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 1580-81 (proposing a statute that would give nom-
inees expedited treatment if the president selected the nominee from a list cre-
ated by the Senate); cf. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role
of the United States Senate in the Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
200 (1987); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution,
and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992); Laura T. Goijanc, Com-
ment, The Solution to the Filibuster Problem: Putting the Advice Back in Advice
and Consent, 54 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1435 (2004) (all urging an increased pre-
nomination role for the Senate).
32. See Law, supra note 17, at 521 (raising this possibility). This approach was taken
in the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, which did not take effect until after the 1996
presidential election. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Story of Clinton v. City of New
York- Congress Can Take Care of Itself, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAw STORIEs 46 (Peter
L. Strauss ed., 2006).
33. On the idea of the veil of ignorance, see JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
136-42 (1971). Adrian Vermeule has discussed delayed effectiveness as one man-
ifestation of the veiling strategy. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 429; Adrian
Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399,
419-20 (2001) ("[Djelay rules take advantage of a preexisting uncertainty-the
inherent unpredictability of the decisionmakers' long-term interests-that would
otherwise be overwhelmed by the incentives to focus on short-term considera-
tions."). To be clear, a confirmations statute would not necessarily have to bene-
fit the president. It could just as easily be designed to make things harder on the
president, such as by statutizing the right to filibuster judicial nominees. But
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Finally, the drafters of a confirmations statute would also likely
include in the statute the "disclaimer" language that Congress has
usually (though not unfailingly) inserted in its modern statutized
rules. This language provides that the statutized procedures are en-
acted "with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House
to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House)
at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of
any other rule of that House."3 4 Now, this language might come as
quite a shock, inasmuch as part of the point of the statute (at least if
one accepts the commitment rationale) is that the statute is supposed
to do more than a rule! Needless to say, this striking language raises
a number of questions about the relationship between statutes and
rules, a theme that arises repeatedly in this Article. To foreshadow, it
may be that this language simply states what the Constitution re-
quires in any event.
In addition to the questions above, the possible inclusion of the dis-
claimer also raises quite palpably the question of whether the pro-
scribed statutory procedures would really be followed. We now turn to
this topic.
C. Would the Statute Work?
While the main point of this Article is to address whether a judicial
fast track would be constitutionally permissible, the inquiry cannot
totally ignore the question whether such a statute could actually work
in practice. If any such statute would be meaningless apart from its
symbolism, that would not necessarily prevent Congress from passing
it. But the stakes would certainly be higher, and the enterprise of
greater moment, if the statute actually accomplished its goals.
There are at least two different types of questions regarding effec-
tiveness: the narrowly legal question whether the statute could be ju-
dicially enforceable and the broader (and probably more important)
question whether, regardless of formal enforcement, the statute would
be treated as binding as a matter of political practice.
Regarding legal enforceability: For any well-socialized lawyer, a
lawsuit trying to compel the Senate to follow certain procedures for
considering a judicial nomination naturally and properly brings to
mind the political question doctrine.35 I will not here conduct a full
such a statute would be less likely to be enacted, inasmuch as it would probably
have to overcome a veto unless it were packaged with must-pass legislation.
34. Trade Act of 1974, § 151, 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (emphasis added);
see generally Bruhl, supra note 8, at 363-66 (discussing these disclaimer clauses
and citing examples of statutes that lack them).
35. For discussions of the justiciability of legislative rules, see JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOC-
RACY'S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE
BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS ch. 2 (2006); John C. Roberts, Are Con-
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doctrinal analysis except to point out in brief form that, examining the
existing case law, there is at least some small room for debate over
justiciability.36
As an initial matter, this is not a situation in which there are sim-
ply no "judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolv-
ing" the question,3 7 as in the classic political question cases such as
those asserting violations of the constitutional provision guaranteeing
that the states will maintain "a republican form of government."38 On
the contrary, the statute here generates questions that are readily
manageable and even easy to answer: Did the Senate hold a vote
within sixty days as the statute requires or didn't it? Further, while
there is a better case to be made that the suit is nonjusticiable because
there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department"-which is another prong of
the political question test 39 -there is some authority to the contrary.
As the Supreme Court said in United States v. Smith, "[When] the
construction to be given to the [Senate] rules affects persons other
than members of the Senate, the question presented is of necessity a
judicial one."40 Just as in Smith, which concerned the Senate's rules
on withdrawing its consent to a nomination, here the affected "outsid-
ers" are the president and a nominee.41 Moreover, even supposing
that the courts are not to take cognizance of disputes over parliamen-
tary rules, here Congress has passed a statute that governs these pro-
ceedings; it is one thing to say that each house is master and judge of
its own rules, but can we so quickly exclude the courts when the
gressional Committees Constitutional? Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers,
and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 530-42 (2001); Michael
B. Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the "Political" Po-
litical Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1990); and Gregory Frederick Van
Tatenhove, Comment, A Question of Power: Judicial Review of Congressional
Rules of Procedure, 76 Ky. L.J. 597 (1987).
36. I address related questions of justiciability at greater length in Aaron-Andrew P.
Bruhl, Return of the Line Item Veto?, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2007).
37. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
38. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4; see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183-86
(1992) (explaining that the Guarantee Clause has generally been treated as
presenting political questions and citing, among other things, Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)).
39. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
40. 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932). See also Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963)
(stating, perhaps too unqualifiedly, that "[i]t has been long settled, of course, that
rules of Congress and its committees are judicially cognizable").
41. Smith can certainly be given a narrower reading under which the holding of jus-
ticiability arose not just because the Senate's rules "affect[ed]" outsiders but be-
cause the Senate's position that it was permitted to reconsider its consent to
Smith's nomination would have required action by outsiders (such as the presi-
dent's rescission of Smith's commission or Smith's resignation). See CHAFETZ,
supra note 35, at 58. As my aim here is not to establish justiciability, there is no
need to pin down the precise scope of cases such as Smith and Yellin.
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United States Code is involved?42 That is, statutizing a rule arguably
bolsters the case for justiciability.
Likely the most powerful basis for the strongly felt notion that the
case must be nonjusticiable is the matter of the remedy.43 Put simply,
if the Senate refuses to hold a hearing or schedule a vote, are federal
marshals armed with a court order going to make them do so-corral-
ling the Senators in the lobby, plopping them down in their seats,
making them mouth "yea" or "nay"? The image is absurd, though here
again the reality is in fact somewhat more complicated. In Powell v.
McCormack, the Supreme Court noted an argument that federal
courts could not issue injunctions compelling House officers like the
speaker to perform specific official acts.4 4 As the Court pointed out,
however, that same problem did not bar a declaratory judgment,
which Powell had also sought and to which the Court deemed him en-
titled.45 Courts have also issued judgments against the president de-
claring that he has a duty to obey a statute.46 It may be that, in the
end, a court would go no further than that to enforce its ruling. But,
even so, flouting a judicial decision is not politically costless.
Now, to be sure, the comments above are not meant to demonstrate
that the Senate's failure to follow the statute would be justiciable. 47 A
42. Cf Minn. Chippewa Tribe v. Carlucci, 358 F. Supp. 973, 975-76 (D.D.C. 1973)
(requiring the president to follow a statutory directive to appoint members to a
commission; "[alithough the President clearly has discretion to choose whom to
appoint to the Council, he apparently has no discretion to decide if the Council
should or should not be constituted").
43. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1993) (citing "the difficulty of fash-
ioning relief' as a factor supporting the conclusion of nonjusticiability).
44. 395 U.S. 486, 517 (1969).
45. Id. at 517-18, 550.
46. E.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 616 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
47. Aside from the political question doctrine, an additional-though probably more
easily surmounted-obstacle is the question of who (if anyone) would have stand-
ing to sue. As it has done in certain environmental protection statutes, Congress
could eliminate all nonconstitutional barriers to standing if it chose. Professors
Fisk and Chemerinsky conclude that a nominee who is supported by a majority of
senators but is denied a vote because of a filibuster would have Article III stand-
ing to challenge the filibuster. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fili-
buster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 233-34 (1997); see also Lee Renzin, Note, Advice,
Consent, and Senate Inaction-Is Judicial Resolution Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1739, 1774-76 (1998) (agreeing that a nominee denied a vote would have stand-
ing). More controversially, they also suggest that a senator might have standing
to challenge a filibuster. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra, at 234-37. That argument
is more difficult after Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), which narrowed the
District of Columbia Circuit's prior law of congressional standing. Finally, I note
that the Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, would
not bar a suit, as the immunity can be defeated by naming the entire legislative
body or its nonlegislator officials as defendants. Powell, 395 U.S. at 501-06; Fisk
& Chemerinsky, supra, at 238.
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betting person would be well advised to put his or her money on a
court avoiding ruling on the merits. In fact, as pointed out above, Con-
gress typically includes "disclaimer" language that purportedly allows
it to change the statute on its own; thus even if the matter were judi-
cially cognizable, the ruling might be that deviating from the statu-
tory procedures was permissible. The important point, however, is
that the very same doubts about enforceability plague fast track and
the dozens of other extant regimes of statutized rules, and those stat-
utes have not been pointless exercises. They often work in practice
regardless of whether they are legally binding. What the courts would
do is almost beside the point.
The question of how and why a confirmations statute would work
in practice is an interesting one in its own right, and one that deserves
some discussion. In Part VI of this Article, I will explain that the stat-
ute might be regarded as practically binding even if not judicially en-
forceable and even if lacking any legal force at all. First, however, we
should turn to the legal analysis and try to pin down the legal status
of the statute.
III. FINDING THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY FOR
THE CONFIRMATIONS STATUTE
In moving on to the legal analysis of the permissibility of a judicial
confirmations statute, it is useful to distinguish at the outset between
two different questions. The first question is whether Congress has
the power to enact such a statute in the first place. Ours is a govern-
ment of enumerated powers, and so every enactment should be
anchored in some constitutional grant of authority.48 The second
question is, assuming prima facie power to enact the statute, whether
the enactment is nonetheless invalid because it conflicts with some
other constitutional provision or principle. For an illustration of the
distinction, suppose that Congress is considering passing a law that
bans or regulates some type of abortion procedure. The first ques-
tion-the question of power to legislate-would be whether some por-
tion of the Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause, grants
Congress the authority to regulate the subject of abortion at all. The
second question would be whether the statute, though within the com-
merce power, is nonetheless invalid in some or all applications be-
cause of some other independent reason, such as the rights to privacy,
equal protection, and so forth.
We can divide the inquiry into the judicial confirmations statute in
the same way. This Part of the Article will consider the first question,
that of legislative power. Surely the Senate could adopt internal rules
48. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This government is
acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.").
[Vol. 85:960
THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS
that reform the confirmations process, but part of the point of a confir-
mations statute is that it is something more than "just" an internal
rule. It is, or at least appears to be, a statute enacted under the Arti-
cle I, Section 7 legislative process. As explored in the next few pages,
there are two potential sources of authority for the statute: the Rules
of Proceedings Clause and the Appointments Clause. I conclude that
probably the former, and certainly the latter, provides a basis for pass-
ing a judicial confirmations statute. Subsequent Parts of the Article
then consider whether, despite the apparent availability of these
sources of power, such a statute is nonetheless impermissible for inde-
pendent reasons.
As we begin the legal analysis, a few words on method are perhaps
in order. This Article does not purport to say which method of consti-
tutional interpretation is the best or the proper method. My approach
will be rather eclectic, employing text, structural inference, practical/
policy considerations, judicial precedents, early commentary such as
The Federalist, and evidence of early practices. Different readers may
well find different facets of the argument more compelling than
others, but my hope is that most readers will find enough that is per-
suasive to them to be satisfied with the argument.
A. Does the Rules of Proceedings Clause Authorize
Statutes?
In attempting to identify the font of power for the judicial confir-
mations statute, we can look first to the Rules of Proceedings Clause.
The clause certainly grants each chamber the power to prescribe rules
of debate through unilateral means: "Each House may determine the
Rules of its Proceedings."4 9 Some would argue that the clause cannot
serve as the source of authority for any action in statutory form. 50
That is, the clause is a grant of power for rulemaking only by unicam-
eral action. Is that view correct, or could the clause also act as a
source of authority for rules set in statutory form?
Relatedly, if the Rules of Proceedings Clause can support a statute,
can it do so by itself or only with an assist from the Necessary and
Proper Clause? That clause gives Congress the legislative power to
enact statutes "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
50. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 430 (suggesting this objection). Vasan Kesavan,
in his exhaustive study of the Electoral Count Act, appears to take this position.
See Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1653, 1734 (2002). But see Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presi-
dential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 160 n.31 (1995) (taking the contrary
view in passing).
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thereof."5 1 An exacting textualist might contend that "the foregoing
Powers" embrace only Section 8's enumerated legislative powers and
that a house of Congress is not a "Department" and obviously not an
"Officer."5 2 Pushing further, is a power of one house a power of "the
Government of the United States" or merely a power of a part of it? To
my mind the more reasonable reading is that the language at issue is
a catch-all meant to encompass all conferred powers without limita-
tion as to the holder of the power. 53 But there is more to consider in
support of that conclusion than examining the bare text.
First, the argument that the rules power cannot authorize statutes
(whether on its own or via the Necessary and Proper Clause) is sus-
ceptible to some apparent counterexamples. Consider the following:
Does Congress have the power to pass a statute creating and regulat-
ing a commission tasked with preparing a book summarizing and ana-
lyzing its internal rules, practices, and parliamentary precedents?5 4 I
am confident that most of us would think it does, but it is hard to see
what power would justify such a statute if not the rules power. And
looking beyond the rulemaking context, one can imagine examples of
many statutes that seem constitutionally unexceptionable (and nor-
matively highly desirable) that can apparently be grounded only on a
unilateral grant of power. For example, the Constitution gives "each
House" the power to secure members' attendance,55 but surely most of
us would think it obvious that Congress also has the power to pass a
statute that makes it a crime to hinder a member's attempt to attend
a session.5 6
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
52. See Kesavan, supra note 50, at 1731-35.
53. Accord Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot
(Univ. of San Diego Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 07-54, 2006). Another way
to arrive at the same result is to ask what powers are vested in "the Government"
as a whole as opposed to its parts; if the answer is "none," then the phrase must
be some kind of catch-all referring to the various institutions of the government.
See Gary Lawson, Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment Require-
ment for Legislative Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause,
83 TEx. L. REV. 1373, 1386 (2005).
54. Cf. 2 U.S.C. § 28 (directing House parliamentarian to compile House precedents
and authorizing him to hire employees and utilize GPO facilities); Pub. L. No.
88-155, 77 Stat. 272 (1963) (directing Senate parliamentarian to supervise
prepararation of revised edition of book on Senate procedure and providing that
parliamentarian shall hold copyright to the book notwithstanding any provision
of the copyright law).
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cls. 1-2.
56. For the examples given in the text, I suppose one could point to the Necessary
and Proper Clause conjoined with any congressional power, on the theory that
things like procedural manuals and unhindered legislators facilitate the exercise
of all congressional powers-interstate commerce, budget authority, and all the
rest. Although "necessary" has been treated as a very loose standard, see infra
note 67 and accompanying text, this would seem to go to or perhaps beyond the
edge of whatever constraint there may be. In any event, the reader is welcome to
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Moving beyond those somewhat squishy appeals to intuition, it is
important to note that Congress certainly believes that the Rules of
Proceedings Clause permits it to act in statutory form. Congress has
enacted dozens of statutes regulating parliamentary procedure, and
when it does so, it typically (though not unfailingly) includes language
stating that the special procedures are "enacted ... as an exercise of
the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Sen-
ate."5 7 In other words, Congress has repeatedly told us what it thinks
provides the authority for these types of enactments, and Congress
says it is the Rules of Proceedings Clause. Although the Supreme
Court has come to be the predominant and final arbiter of constitu-
tional meaning,5 8 members of Congress also take an oath to obey and
uphold the Constitution, and their collective views on the matter are
at least entitled to some weight. 5 9
Adding further support, it appears that early Congresses, for
which the ratification of the Constitution was still fresh in memory,
must have believed that some of the Constitution's grants of unilat-
eral authority could provide a basis for legislating. As noted above,
the very first Congress passed a statute governing the order of busi-
ness at the beginning of each new Congress.6O And just as the Consti-
tution provides that "[elach House" may determine its rules, it also
embrace this theory, though it differs from mine. Cf supra section III.B (ground-
ing the confirmations statute on the Appointments Clause).
57. E.g., Law of April 3, 1939, ch. 36, § 21(a), 53 Stat. 561, 564 (1939) (current ver-
sion at 5 U.S.C. § 901 (2000)); Trade Act of 1974, § 151 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2191(a)); see also STANLEY BACH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., FAST TRACK
OR EXPEDITED PROCEDURES: THEIR PURPOSES, ELEMENTS, AND IMPLICATIONS, CRS
REPORT No. 98-888 (2001) (stating that statutes regulating rules of debate are
enacted pursuant to the rulemaking power); MARTIN B. GOLD, SENATE PROCE-
DURE AND PRACTICE 1, 4-5 (2004) (same). It is also true that Congress has long
believed that the Constitution does not permit one Congress to bind a successor
through a procedural statute. See Bruhl, supra note 8, at 366-70; infra Part IV.
But that goes to the overall legality of a binding statutized rule, not to the thresh-
old question at issue now, namely whether there is prima facie authority to pass
the statute in the first place.
58. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 18 (1958).
59. The subject of Congress' role as constitutional interpreter, and of extrajudicial
constitutional judgment more generally, has generated a large literature. See,
e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000);
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman,
Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 61; Larry Kramer, We
the Court, 115 HARv. L. REV. 4 (2001); Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right
This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071 (1987); Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Consti-
tution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987). My purpose here is not to take a position in
this debate except to make the (I believe uncontroversial) claim that Congress'
views are at least a relevant factor to be considered along with others.
60. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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provides that "[elach House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Re-
turns, and Qualifications of its own Members." 6 1 The method of tak-
ing evidence for election contests had evidently presented recurring
problems in the early years.6 2 Thus, the Fifth Congress, in 1798,
passed a bill that created a method of securing evidence that could be
used in election contests in the House. The statute authorized judges,
magistrates, and justices of the peace from the area where the election
occurred to issue process and take evidence, prescribed penalties for
failure to appear at these local evidentiary hearings, and provided re-
imbursement for witnesses. 63 It is not clear what power this statute
could be thought to carry out, unless it is regarded as a means of effec-
tuating each house's authority over election contests-which is, like
the rulemaking power, a unilateral power of each chamber. Indeed, it
seems a very apt and useful method of effectuating that power. This
evidence of early congressional practice provides a strong reason to
believe that grants of unilateral powers, such as the Rules of Proceed-
ings Clause, can support statutes.6 4
B. The Appointments Clause as a Surer Alternative
For those who are not convinced that the Rule of Proceedings
Clause could provide the authority to pass a statute-and concededly
there is room for debate on that score-I hasten to add that it is not
the only source of authority that can be invoked. While framework
legislation might be authorized by the rulemaking power, an addi-
tional source of authority is the substantive legislative power over the
particular legislative topic that the framework governs. Regimes of
statutized rules are typically passed precisely in order to regulate and
improve Congress' handling of a certain type of recurring legislation-
budgets, military base closures, trade agreements, etc. Regulating
those substantive areas is indisputably within Congress' authority,
and so the framework for considering such bills is permissible so long
as it is a "necessary and proper" method of carrying out that underly-
ing authority.
The judicial confirmations statute effectuates the appointments
power. The appointments power is not an enumerated Article I power
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
62. See, e.g., 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 685-86 (Dec. 6, 1797); see also Currie, supra note 9,
at 174-76.
63. Law of Jan. 23, 1798, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 537.
64. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (stating that "early
congressional enactments 'provid[e] contemporaneous and weighty evidence of
the Constitution's meaning'" (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24
(1986))). I note that Jefferson believed that the congressional immunities under
the Arrest Clause and Speech or Debate Clauses could be effectuated by statute
via the Necessary and Proper Clause. JEFFERSON'S MA UAL, supra note 7, at
129-30.
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but is rather set forth in Article II's description of presidential prerog-
atives, which states that "[the president] shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint" Supreme
Court justices and judges of the lower courts.6 5 The appointments
power falls within the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause be-
cause that clause grants Congress the authority to effectuate the enu-
merated Article I powers plus "all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Depart-
ment or Officer thereof."66 Thus, Congress can pass legislation effectu-
ating the president's appointments power.
The only remaining question, then, is whether a judicial fast track
statute could be considered "necessary and proper" for effectuating the
appointments power. As for the "necessary" in "necessary and
proper," that term long ago came to mean something more like "use-
ful."67 Under that lenient standard, a judicial fast track statute is cer-
tainly a useful and rational measure, especially given the current
state of affairs regarding judicial confirmations, which Congress
might rationally view as requiring serious reform.
The requirement that the legislation be "proper" could be thought
more difficult. Again putting aside for the moment the question
whether the statute is independently "improper" because it violates
some other constitutional rule (a possibility that will be explored in
following Parts of this Article),68 let us here consider the argument
that any statutized rule is per se "improper" because such matters
could and should be done by rule. That is, one could argue that the
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Appointments Clause goes on to provide that
Congress may vest the appointment of "inferior Officers" elsewhere, such as in
the president alone or in the courts. It is agreed that Supreme Court justices are
"principal" officers who can be appointed only by the president and Senate acting
together, but there is some disagreement over whether judges of lower courts are
instead "inferior Officers" that can be appointed through other means if Congress
so chose. Compare Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 191 n.7 (1994) (Souter,
J., concurring), and Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy:
Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 275 n.103 (1992) (lower
court judges not "inferior Officers"), with Tuan Samahon, The Judicial Vesting
Option: Opting Out of Nomination and Advice and Consent, 67 OHIo ST. L.J. 783,
825-32 (2006) (contrary view). I also note that the list of Congress' enumerated
powers in Article I states that Congress can create inferior federal courts, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. That does not necessarily give Congress plenary author-
ity over modes of confirmation for judges of those courts; rather; Article II's Ap-
pointments Clause provides for staffing whatever courts are created under the
Article I power.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
67. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324-25 (1819).
68. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKE L.J. 267 (1993)
(giving separate meaning to the words "necessary" and "proper" and treating the
former as requiring a means-end fit and the latter as requiring conformity with
other constitutional principles).
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plain text of the Rules of Proceedings Clause directly bars any statute
that sets rules, even if that statute is otherwise within Congress'
power to enact. This textual argument would read the clause not only
as a power to act unilaterally-" [e] ach House may"-but as a state-
ment that unilateral action is the only way in which rules can be set.
The clause would not only be permissive as regards unicameral action
but also exclusive. On that view, which is essentially a version of the
sometimes reliable canon of expressio unius, any statute that pur-
ported to set a rule of debate would be void.69
Yet the straightforward textual answer to that argument is that
the text simply does not say that. It says that "[e]ach House may de-
termine the Rules of its Proceedings." It does not say, "and such Rules
may not be set in any other way even if otherwise within Congress'
powers." In order to get to that meaning, one would have to find a
reason to invest the Rules of Proceedings Clause with a bit more con-
tent than what the bare words themselves provide. 70 Elucidating the
contextual and structural considerations bearing on statutized rules is
one of the goals of Part V.
69. The interpretive maxim expressio (or inclusio) unius est exclusio alterius holds
that the inclusion of one thing means the exclusion of another. Here, it would
mean that the inclusion of the unilateral method of setting rules implicitly bars
the use of any other method.
70. There are parallels here to the debate over whether the device of the congres-
sional-executive agreement, which is concluded by the president and then "rati-
fied" through passage of ordinary legislation, can substitute for the formal treaty
route described in the Constitution, which requires approval by two-thirds of the
Senate. The Treaty Clause does not by its own terms provide that it is the only
method for approving international agreements. Some commentators, such as
Professors Ackerman and Golove, have therefore argued that it should not be
understood as limiting Congress' independent Article I legislative power to pass
any law (including laws that implement international agreements) that is other-
wise necessary and proper for carrying out Congress' relevant enumerated pow-
ers, such as the powers of regulating commerce, declaring war, and raising
armies. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 801, 811, 913-14, 919-20 (1995); see also David M. Golove, Against
Free-Form Formalism, 73 NYU L. REV. 1791 (1998) (further defending the nonex-
clusive reading of the Treaty Clause). Professor Tribe, their main antagonist in
the debate, contends that the Treaty Clause is meant to set forth the uniquely
proper method for concluding major international agreements, despite the
clause's lack of the word "only." See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Struc-
ture Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation,
108 HARv. L. REV. 1221, 1240-45, 1249-78 (1995). Whichever side is correct as a
matter of constitutional theory, the two methods of approving international
agreements have as a practical matter come to be viewed as mostly interchangea-
ble, with political considerations typically playing the predominant role in select-
ing one form rather than the other. See 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 6.7 (3d
ed. 1999); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 303 cmt. e (1987).
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This Part has focused on whether some part of the Constitution
provides a font of prima facie authority for a judicial confirmations
statute, leaving aside the question whether the statute is otherwise
forbidden. The answer, I have argued, is that such a statute is author-
ized, either by the Rules of Proceedings Clause itself or (less contro-
versially) by the Appointments Clause. The next step, then, is
whether there is some independent defect, some external impediment
to regulating the appointments process through statutes.
IV. THE PUTATIVE PROBLEM OF
BINDING FUTURE SENATES
The next avenue for challenging the confirmations statute arises
quite naturally as soon as one considers why one might want such a
statute. The statute purports to say that future nominations shall be
handled in a particular way. Presumably part of the point of enacting
such a statute is to provide clear ground rules to be applied neutrally
to future confirmations, regardless of the future partisan configura-
tions of the Senate and presidency. 71 This commitment dynamic is
characteristic of, and indeed central to, many regimes of statutized
rules. For example, Congress passed the Electoral Count Act to try to
prevent partisan opportunism in hotly contested election disputes,
and Congress requires proposals for closing military bases to be con-
sidered in an indivisible package because it realizes that otherwise
every legislator could try to exempt bases in his or her own district,
with the result that no unneeded installations would ever close. 72
These are sensible approaches for Congress to employ.
Although statutized rules have a long history stretching back to
the earliest days of the Republic, Congress also has nearly as long a
history of questioning whether it is truly bound to follow them. The
1789 statute governing the order of business at the beginning of a new
Congress came into dispute in 1860 when a congressman, pointing to
the old statute, objected that it was out of order for the House to adopt
standing rules before swearing in the clerk, because the 1789 statute
provided that the clerk should take his oath before the House entered
onto any other business. The Speaker overruled the point of order,
and a number of other parliamentary precedents from the 1800s like-
71. See supra section II.A.
72. On the commitment dynamics of the Electoral Count Act, see, for example, SA-
MUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY
AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at 97 (2001); and Garrett, Purposes,
supra note 8, at 737-41. On the commitment dynamics of base closures, see, for
example, Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 481-82 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in
part); Garrett, Purposes, supra note 8, at 760.
2007] 983
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
wise deem similar statutory procedural directives nonbinding.73 Per-
haps in recognition of those precedents, today Congress almost always
inserts disclaimer clauses providing that the statutized rules can be
changed "at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent" as
any internal rule.74 It may believe that such clauses merely reflect
what is necessarily true as a matter of constitutional law. 75
On those occasions when one house of Congress decides that it may
properly deviate from a statutized rule, one can legitimately wonder
whether legislators' objections are really based on constitutional prin-
ciple or are instead simply a reflection of the opportunism the statute
was probably intended to curtail, mixed with the thought that they
can probably get away with it. But if there is a principled objection, a
real legal problem with letting statutized rules bind the way statutes
do, what would it be? This Part of the Article considers the possibility
that the legal defect in a judicial confirmations statute is entrench-
ment, the attempt by one legislature to pass a measure that purports
to govern later legislatures. After all, if part of the point of a judicial
fast track is to try to bind senators to behave a certain way in future
confirmation proceedings, the natural challenge is that this violates
the venerable anti-entrenchment norm under which one period's legis-
lators are not supposed to be able to bind their successors. Indeed,
with regard to other regimes of statutized rules, critics have leveled
exactly that charge. 7 6
In previous work I have argued that the entrenchment challenge is
misguided or at least incomplete: While doubtless having some intui-
tive appeal, the anti-entrenchment rule fails to capture the real prob-
lem (if any) with statutized rules.7 7 The judicial confirmations statute
at issue in this Article requires a modified analysis, because only the
Senate votes on nominees, and the Senate has some peculiar features
73. On the 1860 incident, see 1 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES § 245 (1907). For a fuller description of this and similar
episodes, see Bruhl, supra note 8, at 366-69.
74. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 107-139, at 54 (2002) (stating that the Constitution already
reserves unilateral control over the rules); S. REP. No. 104-2, at 15 (1995) (same).
But see H.R. REP. No. 98-257, pt. 3, at 5 (1983) (expressing doubt over whether a
house can modify a statutized rule and therefore recommending use of the Dis-
claimer Clause).
76. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control
the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 225-27 (1986); Kesavan, supra note 50,
at 1779-81. But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrench-
ment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1699-700 (2002) (suggesting a separa-
tion of powers challenge); Vermeule, supra note 8, at 430 (same). Also relevant
here is Solimine, supra note 4, at 568-82, which discusses entrenchment and sep-
aration of powers issues concerning statutory restrictions on nepotistic
appointments.
77. See generally Bruhl, supra note 8, at 376-82.
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that bear on the entrenchment analysis. As explained below, that dif-
ference makes the entrenchment critique even less satisfying here
than it is with regard to other regimes of statutized rules.
A. The Failure of the Entrenchment Critique
The anti-entrenchment norm, as it is generally stated, holds that
one legislature cannot pass a measure that purports to be immune
from amendment or repeal by future legislative action of the same
form.7 8 Thus, to pick a paradigmatic example, Congress cannot pass a
statute that purports to establish tax rates that can never be repealed.
Similarly, a statute that purported to establish that it could be
amended in the future only with the concurrence of a four-fifths
supermajority would likewise be impermissibly entrenching. Al-
though it is not clear exactly which portion of the Constitution forbids
entrenchment, there is broad agreement that it is unconstitutional. 79
Other types of measures besides statutes can be subject to at-
tempts at entrenchment: Executive orders, constitutional provisions,
or parliamentary rules could all purport to restrict or outright forbid
their own repeal. Indeed, the Constitution contains two provisions
that purport to be entrenched in different ways. Namely, Article V
provides that no amendment relating to the slave trade or head taxes
could be passed until 1808 and that no amendment can deprive a state
of equal representation in the Senate without its consent.8 0
While the judicial fast track statute certainly has a feel of en-
trenchment about it inasmuch as it attempts to prescribe how the
Senate will in the future consider nominees, it is clearly not a legisla-
tive entrenchment in the ordinary sense. The fast track statute itself
78. See John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legisla-
tion: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1777-78
(2003) (employing this definition); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 76, at 1667
(same). For the seminal modern treatment of the topic, see Julian N. Eule, Tem-
poral Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 12 AM.
BAR FOUND. RES. J. 379 (1987).
79. See, e.g., Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905) (stating the rule but
citing no authority); see also Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A
Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972) (calling the rule "so obvious
as rarely to be stated"). The rule finds its heritage at least in part in the British
principle of parliamentary sovereignty. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 37-38, 62-63 (8th ed. 1915); David S.
Law, The Paradox of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, and Commitments, 40
GA. L. REV. 407, 414 (2006). Professors Posner and Vermeule tried to upset the
conventional wisdom that entrenchment is impermissible in a 2002 article, see
supra note 76, but their effort has met with skepticism and strong reassertions of
the old learning, see Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 78; John 0. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Norma-
tive Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 386-416 (2003).
80. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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would not purport to be irrepealable. Unlike the statute that at-
tempts to set tax rates that can never be changed, this statute does
not purport to be binding against subsequent legislative action of the
same form. It could be amended as any other statute. To be sure, as a
practical matter, repealing a statute is no easy matter, given our veto-
gate-studded legislative process.S1 And beyond the usual inertia, it is
possible that a judicial confirmations statute might come to acquire an
institutional status and legitimacy that insulates it from ordinary
politics, especially if it were viewed as the considered, tranquilizing
settlement of a deep and long-running political divide.82 But none of
these practical impediments amount to entrenchment. Social Security
and the Sherman Act would be hard to repeal for practical political
reasons, but they are not entrenched.
Since the confirmations statute is not entrenched in the ordinary
way, what is the source of the feeling of impropriety that surrounds
statutized rules? One might be tempted to say that the legislature
has engaged in "rules entrenchment." Applying the anti-entrench-
ment norm to the domain of parliamentary rules, the principle would
be that a legislative body should not be allowed to adopt a rule of de-
bate that cannot be repealed, or can be repealed only through a bur-
densome process.8 3 Continuing along this line of argument, one could
contend that the legislature has by means of the confirmations statute
adopted a procedural rule with the peculiar and burdensome feature
that it can be amended only if both houses (and the president) go
through the Article I, Section 7 legislative process-an impermissible
attempt at entrenching the rule against change. The argument would
thus conclude that a binding confirmations statute is illegal.8 4
While there may be some sense to the foregoing line of argument, it
clearly sets out on completely the wrong foot. Congress simply has not
adopted a queer and hard-to-change parliamentary rule; it has en-
81. For background on the proceduralist/vetogate approach to the legislative process,
see generally KEITH KREHBIEL, PrvoTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING
(1998); and McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994).
82. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DuKE L.J. 1215
(2001).
83. It is not entirely clear that the case against legislative entrenchment applies with
equal force to rules entrenchment. See Bruhl, supra note 8, at 379-80; Virginia
A. Seitz & Joseph R. Guerra, A Constitutional Defense of "Entrenched" Senate
Rules Governing Debate, 20 J.L. & POL. 1, 22-32 (2004). Nonetheless, the argu-
ment in the text will assume that rules entrenchment is just as bad as statutory
entrenchment.
84. As noted earlier, Congress usually includes disclaimer language stating that ei-
ther house may deviate from the statutized rules, and it may believe that such a
result is mandated as a matter of constitutional law. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 74-75. Here we are attempting to determine if Congress' view is correct
and, if so, what principle makes it is correct.
[Vol. 85:960986
2007] THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS
acted a formally unexceptionable statute. The problem (if there is one)
is that the legislature has used a statute instead of an internal rule. It
has done something by one method that is usually done by another
method. This substitution may well be a problem, but is it really an
entrenchment problem?
It is not. There are two separate reasons why entrenchment is not
the real problem here. To see the first reason, let us (for now) accede
to the apparent assumption that there would be an entrenchment
problem if the statute were harder to change than a parliamentary
rule. That is, let us assume that the important thing is the relative
difficulty of change under the two different vehicles. The trouble is
that, purely as a practical empirical matter, it is not at all clear that
enacting procedures by the statutory route makes them harder to
change than if they were done through the Senate's internal rules pro-
cess. In fact, from the point of view of the practicalities and probabili-
ties, the statute might be an improvement in terms of mutability.
Why? Because the Senate's rules provide that the rules remain in ef-
fect from one Congress to the next unless they are affirmatively
changed. s 5 The Senate's rules further provide that ending debate on a
motion to change the rules requires the assent of two-thirds of those
present and voting, even more than the sixty required to close debate
on legislation. s 6 Thus, the Senate's rules are hard to amend, if one
obeys them. Senator Frist's threatened "nuclear option" would have
changed all of that, of course, and it could be threatened again in the
future by either party. But the status quo is that the Senate's rules
are hard to change, and it is a status quo that the Senate has repeat-
edly reaffirmed and which has proven highly resistant to efforts at
change.8 7
Which is more difficult, then: using the Senate's rules process
(which requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate) or repealing ordinary
85. SEN. RULE V.2 ("The rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the
next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules."). The House
of Representatives, in contrast, reenacts its internal rules at the beginning of
each new Congress. It is usually said that the reason for this difference is that
the Senate, but not the House, is a "continuing body." 1 GEORGE HAYNES, THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (1938); FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S.
FRUMIN, RIDDICK'S SENATE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 101-28, at 1220 (1992). This
notion of the Senate as a continuing body is frequently stated but has not re-
ceived much sustained scrutiny and may provide a fruitful avenue for further
research. Accord Seth Barrett Tillman, Noncontemporaneous Lawmaking: Can
the 110th Senate Enact a Bill Passed by the 109th House?, 17 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2007) (agreeing that the idea is problematic and war-
rants further scrutiny).
86. SEN. RULE XXII.2.
87. See Seitz & Guerra, supra note 83, at 12-15 (discussing past attempts to change
the rules); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Filibustering Ju-
dicial Nominations, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 348-51 (2005) (same).
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legislation (which requires majorities in both houses and, if filibus-
tered, requires sixty votes in the Senate)? The answer to that ques-
tion is highly contingent and depends on factors such as the partisan
makeup of each chamber, which party controls the presidency, and the
nature of the proposed change.8 8 It is perhaps illuminating that in
the roughly similar context of the Treaty Clause (under which ratifica-
tion of treaties requires two-thirds of the Senate), it is generally
thought that implementing international agreements through the or-
dinary legislative process is easier.8 9 In any case, the fact that the
answer may differ from situation to situation shows that the relative
practical difficulty of acting through one vehicle rather than the other
cannot be the touchstone here.
That observation leads to the second and more important reason
that the entrenchment idiom cannot express the real problem with
setting rules by statute: The entrenchment critique is wrong to as-
sume that the key question is whether one route is harder than the
other. For example, suppose Congress wishes to eliminate the estate
tax, and it is considering two different ways it might go about doing
so. First, it could pass an ordinary statute eliminating the tax, which
statute does not purport to be irrepealable. Second, it could by two-
thirds vote of both houses pass a resolution proposing a constitutional
amendment for ratification by the states. If the measure is success-
fully done as a constitutional amendment, Congress will no longer be
able to change policy in this area by the relatively simpler expedient of
passing a statute. Changing policy would instead require a burden-
some process that requires a supermajority vote and participation of
entities outside of the legislature. Yet, all the same, nobody could
properly accuse Congress of violating the anti-entrenchment rule if it
used a constitutional amendment. (One could say that the amend-
ment was unwise for hamstringing future fiscal policy, but that is a
different matter.) There is no entrenchment problem because, while
Congress went with the more onerous method and locked the policy in
(namely by bringing the states into the matter), either route was cer-
tainly permissible; that is, elimination of the estate tax is an accept-
88. One might think that two-thirds of each house would always be required to
amend a statute governing the confirmation process, because any such amend-
ment would have to overcome a veto. But that assumes that the attempted
change would go against the president, which it need not. And a change to the
statute could be packaged with other legislation in an effort to frustrate the presi-
dent's veto.
89. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 70, at 861-66; Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Execu-
tive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1004 (2001)
("[Hlistorical experience-and indeed the origins of the congressional-executive
agreement-would seem to indicate that the Senate route presents the higher
hurdle.").
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able subject for either legislation or a constitutional amendment.
Congress had a choice of vehicles, and it chose the more durable one.
The same is true of a confirmations statute. Assume that changing
the statute is more difficult than changing internal rules, in particular
because it requires participation of outsiders. That added increment
of difficulty is legally irrelevant if it is permissible to use the statutory
form to regulate such matters. We saw in Part III above that statutes
regulating internal rules are within the prima facie Article I legisla-
tive power. If statutes can properly regulate such matters, it is irrele-
vant whether the statute is harder to change than a rule: Congress
had a choice of vehicles, and it chose the more durable one. In the end,
then, the entrenchment critique basically begs the question. What is
needed is an independent account of why it is wrong for statutes to
govern such matters, which the anti-entrenchment norm itself cannot
provide.
B. The Rules of Proceedings Clause as an Anti-
Entrenchment Rule?
Before leaving the general topic of anti-entrenchment, we should
briefly consider a specific entrenchment-tinged argument that derives
from the text of the Rules of Proceedings Clause. The clause states
that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings." One
could argue that this language should be taken to mean that rules can
be considered afresh by each new House or Senate (i.e., the 109th, the
110th, and so on). In other words, this line of reasoning would mean
that each chamber always has text-derived plenary authority to start
anew at least every two years, regardless of any old rule or even
statute.
This anti-entrenchment version of the Rules of Proceedings Clause
will not work. The clause's drafting history indicates that the refer-
ence to "[e]ach House" does not carry a temporal connotation. That is,
the language does not convey that each new house must be allowed to
determine its rules from scratch every two years, regardless of what
has happened before. The language just means that the House and
Senate may act independently. This is clear because, among other
reasons, an earlier draft of the Constitution had two separate clauses
conferring rulemaking power on each chamber separately, but the
clauses were later consolidated in the course of stylistic redrafting into
a single clause referring to "Fe]ach House."9o Further, it does not fol-
low from the Rules of Proceedings Clause itself that a chamber could
not entrench its rules. If the Senate enacted an irrepealable rule, it
90. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 140, 142 (Max Far-
rand ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS]; see also Posner & Vermeule, supra note 76,
at 1683 (also adopting this interpretation).
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would still be the Senate that was determining its rules of proceed-
ings, not some other entity. Of course, one might be inclined to object
that it would be a "different" Senate that is later saddled with the
irrepealable rule. That objection, however, would encounter a diffi-
culty in the form of the widely accepted but somewhat mysterious no-
tion that the Senate is a continuing body, such that it makes no sense
to speak of a "different" Senate. 9 1
In sum, the anti-entrenchment rule-whether by itself or read
through the lens of the Rules of Proceedings Clause-cannot tell us
what, if anything, is wrong with a confirmations statute.
V. INTERFERING WITH SENATE AUTONOMY
Briefly summarizing the argument so far, recall that Part III con-
cluded that, leaving aside whether there is some independent basis for
faulting a confirmations statute, the statute is otherwise within Con-
gress' delegated powers to enact. Part IV began the search for inde-
pendent defects by considering whether a statute governing
confirmation procedures offends the anti-entrenchment norm, and it
also considered whether the plain text of the Rules of Proceedings
Clause itself expresses an anti-entrenchment rule. Those approaches
were found unsatisfactory to explain what, if anything, is problematic
about the statute.
This Part of the Article considers whether the answer can be found
in deeper principles that are inherent in the Constitution's overall
structure of divided powers. I contend that the answer can be found in
such structural considerations, in particular in a principle of cameral
autonomy over procedure that is tied to-but goes beyond and informs
the meaning of-the Rules of Proceedings Clause. Because of this
principle, no confirmations statute could purport to govern the Sen-
ate's procedures against the Senate's own will, for that result would
give the president and the House a veto over the Senate's internal
procedures.
In explaining this principle, it is perhaps most helpful to begin by
explaining what it is not. In particular, although a confirmations stat-
ute could well be written so as to greatly increase the president's
power over nominations, the cameral autonomy principle is not a prin-
ciple about the president getting his way too much, as the next section
explains. Thus, even if the substance of the statute enhanced the Sen-
ate's power at the president's expense, it would still be problematic
because it regulates the Senate's rules through statutory means. By
doing so, the statute chips away at one important aspect of the cham-
ber's autonomy.
91. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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A. How Policy Outcomes Are Not the Issue
Consider fast track regimes in other policy areas. As the reader
will recall, a key element of the typical fast track arrangement for con-
sidering legislation is that it forbids the legislature from amending the
president's proposed bill. Thus, the president can make a take-it-or-
leave-it proposition and Congress must simply vote up or down. In
contrast, under the usual procedure of Article I, Section 7, it is the
Congress that formulates a bill and has the power to present the pres-
ident with a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. Because of this reversal,
policy under fast track will be set substantially closer to the presi-
dent's ideal point than it would be under Article I, Section 7.92 But
the fast track regime for considering legislation represents more than
just a quantitative shift in policy outcomes. It is also a qualitative
reversal of the Constitution's structure for decisionmaking. Fast track
is troubling because, under Article I, Section 7, the legislature is sup-
posed to occupy the dominant role in the legislative process through
its power to propose. Thus, I have argued, fast track represents a wor-
rying departure from the Constitution's vision of the proper lawmak-
ing process. 9 3
But plainly that particular problem is not present with a judicial
fast track statute. Judicial appointments are one of the rare cases in
which the Constitution provides the president with the power to pro-
pose take-it-or-leave-it choices. In other words, the appointments pro-
cess presents the mirror image of the usual legislative process, and
thus the president enjoys a structural advantage in this realm.9 4 This
92. Scholars who have studied the strategic effect of amendment rules have shown
that a system of closed rules (that is, rules barring amendment) systematically
advantages the person proposing a measure, allowing the proposal-maker to set
policy closer to his preferred outcome than he could under a system of open rules.
See David P. Baron, A Sequential Choice Theory Perspective on Legislative Organ-
ization, in POSITIVE THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 71, 84-85 (Ken-
neth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1995); David P. Baron & John A.
Ferejohn, Bargaining in Legislatures, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1181, 1188, 1197-98,
1200 (1989). Fast track is essentially a regime of closed rules with the president
as proposal-maker. Likewise, research on referenda-which, like fast track, pre-
sent the voters with unamendable, take-it-or-leave-it choices-has demonstrated
that the entity that has the procedural power to make the proposal enjoys a tre-
mendous advantage over those who vote on it. See Thomas Romer & Howard
Rosenthal, Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allo-
cation by Direct Democracy, 93 Q.J. ECON. 563, 564 (1979); Thomas Romer &
Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the
Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27, 27-28, 35-36 (1978); see generally David P.
Baron & John Ferejohn, The Power to Propose, in MODELS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE
IN POLITICS 343 (Peter C. Ordeshook ed. 1989).
93. Bruhl, supra note 8, at 400-02.
94. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal
Appointments Process, 21 HARv. J.L. & PB. POL'Y 467, 481 (1997) (noting this
reversal and the president's resulting advantage); David S. Law & Lawrence B.
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is one important difference between a judicial fast track and other fast
track regimes, and it eliminates one obvious ground for condemning
the confirmations statute.
That is not to say that the judicial fast track would not bring about
any change in outcomes, for certainly it would. Under the current re-
gime where filibusters of nominees are possible, the president has to
submit a nominee that is minimally palatable to sixty senators-that
is, one who is not so distasteful that forty senators would be willing to
filibuster the nominee in addition to voting against him or her. If no
filibuster were possible, then the president need only submit a nomi-
nee that is acceptable to a bare majority.9 5 This is an especially im-
portant difference when the Senate is roughly evenly divided between
the parties. In such a Senate, getting a nominee past sixty senators
will always require at least some (perhaps small) degree of bipartisan
support. But if the president and the Senate majority are of the same
party, then a confirmations statute that eliminated the filibuster
would permit approval of nominees that receive no support from the
minority party. This represents a substantial increase in the presi-
dent's ability to choose nominees that are closer to his ideal point,
which would be a big change.
But however large, this shift would not be a problem, constitution-
ally speaking. While there is a vigorous dispute over whether the fili-
buster is constitutionally permissible,9 6 nobody believes that it is
constitutionally required. A statute barring filibusters of judicial
nominations therefore cannot be condemned on the ground that it lets
the president have too much power to select nominees that fit his pref-
erences. (And, of course, that charge would also be irrelevant if made
against a more evenhanded or even pro-Senate statute.)
If we want to find structural grounds on which to condemn the ju-
dicial fast track, I would suggest that we look to changes that are sub-
tler than those just described. A useful way to get there is with an
example of how a president might use a binding confirmations statute.
The example will help us see that the problem here is not substantive
Solum, Judicial Selection, Appointments Gridlock, and the Nuclear Option, 15 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 77 (2006) (same).
95. For simple but illuminating formal models that show the impact of the filibuster
on the president's ability to shape the judiciary, see Law & Solum, supra note 94;
and McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 23.
96. For a few entries in this debate, see Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 87; Michael
J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445
(2004); Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change
Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Over Come the Filibuster,
28 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 205 (2004); Arthur L. Rizer III, The Filibuster of
Judicial Nominations: Constitutional Crisis or Politics as Usual?, 32 PEPP. L.
REV. 847 (2005); and Seitz & Guerra, supra note 83.
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policy outcomes so much as interference with legislative dignity and
autonomy.
B. The Practicalities and Indignities of a Non-Autonomous
Senate
Following the model of other fast track statutes, our contemplated
judicial fast track statute contains provisions requiring committee ac-
tion within a fixed number of days (with automatic reporting to the
floor if the committee fails to act) and requiring a prompt vote by the
full Senate.
While this might not seem like a serious imposition at first
glance-surely it is not too much to ask of the Senate that it simply
hold a timely vote-to view it as a matter of "mere" scheduling is to
miscomprehend the workings of the legislature. As an institution,
Congress has a limited agenda and can consider only a small number
of significant proposals at any given time. Oftentimes crucial bills will
languish for months, finally passing only in a final flurry of dealmak-
ing and voting that precedes adjournment. In part this is a result of
the difficult and time-consuming nature of legislating in the modern
Congress. But much of it comes from carefully orchestrated political
maneuvering between the majority and the minority, the leadership
and backbenchers, and the White House and Congress. As all of these
political actors recognize, the "mere" timing of a vote can mean nearly
everything.
The confirmations statute would grant the president powerful pre-
rogatives. Most obviously, it would allow the president to time a vote
in order to maximize the nominee's chances of success, which might
mean lining up a vote right after an incident that was embarrassing to
opponents in Congress or timing the vote to coincide with a public
campaign in support of the nominee (such as Republicans' "Justice
Sunday" events in recent years). The president could force senators to
take a stand on a nominee at a time of his choosing, surely calculated
for optimal presidential leverage, rather than at a time chosen by the
Senate itself. Compounding that effect, the fixed timetables for con-
sidering the nomination could, among other things, prevent the Sen-
ate from fully investigating a potential problem with the nominee or
head off the formation of an effective opposition campaign. 9 7
97. For discussion and data on the importance of the timing of hearings and confir-
mation votes, see LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 89-92 (2005); Sarah A. Binder & Forrest
Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998, 46 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 190, 195-96 (2002); and Charles R. Shipan & Megan L. Shannon, Delay-
ing Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations, 47 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 654, 656-57 (2003). Providing anecdotal support are the comments of
Nixon staffer Bud Krogh, who urged Nixon to "deny[ I [opponents] the time neces-
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More ominously, the president could use the nomination process to
interfere with other business on the legislative agenda. A Supreme
Court nomination will draw massive media coverage and will be a
highly salient vote to interest groups and many ordinary citizens, and
it is likely to crowd out many other issues during the statutory confir-
mation period. Currently the president can control only the timing of
his announcement, but with a binding confirmations statute he could
also initiate a statutory period of (say) thirty or sixty days during
which the Senate (and the media) would have to focus significant en-
ergy on considering his nominee. Especially when the Senate is con-
trolled by the opposing party, the president could thus use the statute
to attempt to derail legislation with which he disagrees, for example,
or to deflate calls for a congressional investigation of administration
malfeasance. (Suppose, for instance, that the Judiciary Committee
were poised to investigate NSA wiretapping or the vice president's
role in outing a CIA agent, conceivable possibilities now that the Dem-
ocrats control the Senate.) These opportunities for manipulation are
not just the imaginings of paranoid legislators. A concrete example of
such timing occurred in the summer of 2005 when President Bush evi-
dently advanced his Supreme Court nomination announcements in or-
der to divert attention from recent developments concerning advisors'
involvement in the Plame affair.98
One could ask why the Senate would not simply change its rules to
prevent presidential manipulation, but that of course is the problem
with statutizing a rule: if taken seriously, the statute would mean
that the Senate had surrendered its power to govern its proceedings
solely of its own accord. 99 There is something intuitively troubling
about the prospect of a legislative body that is unable to exercise con-
trol over its own rules and the flow of its own debates. Exactly why it
is troubling may be hard to articulate, but it may be that the crispest
sary to make a public case against a man. The longer these procedures drag out,
the more difficult it is for us to get our [nominee] through." EPSTEIN & SEGAL,
supra, at 91.
98. See, e.g., Jess Bravin and Jeanne Cummings, Bush Aides Consider Female Suc-
cessor to O'Connor, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2005, at A4 (quoting a lawyer who con-
sults with the White House); Bush to Announce Supreme Court Nominee, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., July 19, 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/07/19/america/
web.0719court.php ("Sources said the timing of an announcement had been
moved up in part to deflect attention away from a CIA leak controversy that has
engulfed Bush's top political adviser, Karl Rove."); see also Mary Ellen Schoon-
maker, The Kind Conservative and the Careless President, N.J. REC. (Bergen,
N.J.), Nov. 3, 2005, at L11 ("Alito's nomination-and the firestorm it will almost
certainly create in the Senate-conveniently takes Lewis Libby and Prosecutor
Patrick Fitzgerald and Karl Rove and Judy Miller and Valerie Plame off the front
pages and out of the spotlight.")
99. As noted previously, the statutes typically include disclaimers permitting each
house to change the rules, but we are here trying to see whether and why that
might be constitutionally required.
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and most concise way to capture what is wrong is simply this: It is
humiliating to the legislative body. A legislature without the power to
govern its own internal affairs has an air of servility about it. History
gives us examples of assemblies who took their daily agendas from the
executive (typically a monarch),l0 0 but it seems beneath the dignity of
the House and Senate given their roles as the equal of the executive.
Schoolchildren might have to ask permission to use the restroom, but
a legislative body should not.
To express institutional relations in the idiom of dignity and hu-
miliation might seem out of place, but viscerally perceived indignities
can sometimes signal that something is amiss in the constitutional
order. As some scholars have pointed out, concepts such as dignity
figure prominently in recent federalism and state sovereign immunity
decisions.'o x Indeed, a vague sense of indignity may be the best way
to explain the Supreme Court's "anti-commandeering" cases, which
forbid the federal government from requiring state legislatures or ex-
ecutive officials to carry out federal policy. In such cases, the Court
candidly recognizes that Congress has the power to regulate the par-
ticular subjects itself, preempting and nullifying the state's own regu-
lations; further, Congress can persuade a state into regulating in a
particular way by attaching strings to federal funds.1o 2 What then
could be so bad about the federal government simply requiring state
officials to carry out federal policy? The Court's answer in Printz
takes a decidedly dignitary turn: The states are "reduc[ed] ... to pup-
pets of a ventriloquist Congress"; it is incompatible with their "auton-
omy" to have their officers "dragooned" or "impressed" into federal
service.10 3 So, too, in Alden v. Maine, a state immunity decision,
which deemed it an unacceptable affront to the state's "dignity" to
"press a State's own courts into federal service" or to "commandeer the
entire political machinery of the State against its will."'o 4 Similarly,
state "dignity" bars the federal government from telling a state where
to put its capital.10 5 States can be preempted and pressured, but their
organs of government cannot be occupied and inhabited by a federal
puppetmaster pulling the strings.
100. As noted below, the British monarchs held this power over Parliament until sev-
eral hundred years ago. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court's New Fed-
eralism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245 (2000); Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Ad-
ding Insult to Injury; Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1946-54 (2003); Suzanna Sherry, States Are
People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (2000); Timothy Zick, Statehood as the
New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental "States' Rights," 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 213, 250-81 (2004).
102. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158-60, 166-68 (1992).
103. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997).
104. 527 U.S. 716, 749, 758 (1999).
105. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565-66, 579-80 (1911).
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The "dignity" possessed by each house of Congress has not been as
often remarked, but it also sometimes fills in lacunae in the constitu-
tional text. For example, the Constitution provides that each house
can discipline its own members,' 0 6 but it does not speak to its ability
to discipline outsiders. Nonetheless, in 1821 the Supreme Court held
that Congress has the inherent authority to punish nonmembers for
contempt. Otherwise, the Court said, Congress would have no power
of self-preservation and it would be "exposed to every indignity."O 7 In
light of these structural dignity cases, might there also be an imper-
missible affront to legislative dignity if a president commandeers Con-
gress' rules and uses their own procedures against them?
I do not mean to carry the dignity theme too far. The notion of an
affront to congressional dignity can provide a hint that something may
be amiss, but it is of course no answer. It is too vague and generalized
to offer real guidance. But just as states' dignity is concretized and
operationalized into the more specific anti-commandeering principle
in cases like Printz, so, too, can we identify more particular principles
into which the concept of legislative dignity crystallizes. There may be
a variety of such principles, but the one that I will present and defend
here is a structural principle of cameral autonomy over procedure. Or,
somewhat more colorfully, it is the principle that Congress, and each
chamber of Congress, is to be "master in [its] own house."10 8 This
principle is tied to the Rules of Proceedings Clause but goes beyond it
and informs its proper reading. It prevents the president, or even the
other house of Congress, from interfering with a chamber's internal
governance. The next section will build up this principle in a more
systematic fashion.
C. Cameral Autonomy over Procedure
One starting place for discovering the import of an obscure part of
the Constitution is in the debates accompanying its drafting and rati-
fication. As it happens, however, the Rules of Proceedings Clause did
not generate any substantive debate at the Philadelphia Convention
or in the states. 10 9 That is perhaps to be expected given that some
members of the founding generation, including Thomas Jefferson, be-
lieved that the clause simply reflected a general right to self-govern-
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
107. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228-33 (1821).
108. The phrase was used in passing in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 630 (1935), which involved the president's power to remove a member of
the Federal Trade Commission. The phrase "cameral autonomy" is used in
Vermeule, supra note 8.
109. For a (necessarily) brief account of the adoption of the Rules of Proceedings
Clause, see Roberts, supra note 35, at 528-30.
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ment derived from natural law.11o Even if the clause did not exist, he
evidently thought, the power would inhere in each body nonetheless.
To similar effect, Story later wrote:
If the [rules] power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact
the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation,
and order. The humblest assembly of men is understood to possess this
power; and it would be absurd to deprive the councils of the nation of a like
authority. 1 11
But while the power to govern one's own proceedings may seem
natural or even obvious, it should not be taken as a given. The power
to govern its own debates was in fact a right that Parliament had to
wrest from the crown over the course of hundreds of years. At least
through the reign of Elizabeth I, which ended in 1603, the monarch
frequently controlled the order of business in the House of Com-
mons. 112 Queen Elizabeth repeatedly prevented the House from dis-
cussing topics or considering legislation she disfavored, and members
who persisted in pressing such matters were on occasion sent to the
Tower of London.113 Indeed, highlighting the dignitary dimension of
control over the order of proceedings, she is said to have remarked
that "[no monarch] fit for his state will suffer such absurdities" as a
Parliament that would discuss topics of its own choosing.114 In sum,
the crown was the agenda-setter. None of this is to suggest that Eliza-
bethan times, rather than later events, were foremost in the mind of
the founding generation. The point is simply that the decision repre-
sented by the Rules of Proceedings Clause is in no sense the obvious
and only possible arrangement, as shown by the contrast with not-too-
ancient British practice.
To appreciate the significance of the rulemaking power, we must
view it in conjunction with a group of other parts of Article I that keep
similarly low profiles but that together support an important principle
of cameral autonomy.115 In relying on various portions of the Consti-
tution to argue for a structural principle, there is of course always the
110. See 17 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 195 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 1950).
111. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 835 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
112. 4 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 97-98, 176 (3d ed. 1945).
The crown's control over the House's business was increasingly subject to resis-
tance and began to loosen toward the end of Elizabeth's reign. Id. at 90.
113. Id. at 89-90, 178-79.
114. Id. at 90.
115. In British constitutional law and history, many of the topics discussed in this
portion of the Article-a house's control over its proceedings and elections, its
power to protect itself from interference and intimidation, etc.-would fall under
the convenient organizing label of parliamentary privilege. In this country, the
concept of legislative privilege is less familiar as an organizing label, even though
the Constitution in fact incorporates many of the traditional privileges of Parlia-
ment. For a recent attempt to provide a unified comparative treatment of the
British and American law of legislative privilege, see CHAFETZ, supra note 35.
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risk that one will let a totalizing theoretical construct overwhelm
what the Constitution actually does and says. The Constitution is a
practical document, so one should not expect it to display the theoreti-
cal purity of a theology treatise. The Constitution is in large part the
result of compromise between delegates from large and small states
and between those with different views of how democratic the new
government should be and which branch of it should predominate.
Thus, it should not come as a surprise that cameral autonomy is not
absolute. The Constitution itself lays down certain immutable proce-
dural rules (regarding quorum requirements, for example) and re-
quires the houses to take certain actions, rather than leaving those
matters to the free choice of the legislature itself.116 Further, there
are circumstances in which each house must interact with the other
and with the president even in matters touching on legislative proce-
dure, such as the president's power (discussed below) to summon the
legislature on extraordinary occasions and, if the houses cannot agree
on when to adjourn, to adjourn them. Nor, as a normative matter, is
autonomy an unalloyed good to be maximized at all costs, as it carries
with it the risk of self-dealing; as Adrian Vermeule has explained, the
question of the degree of autonomy versus dependence to grant to va-
rious institutions is a serious question of constitutional design with
considerations on both sides.117
Nonetheless, although there are ways in which the separate
branches of government must act together, and although there are
perils of self-dealing, various portions of the Constitution do generate
a general background rule that the executive (and the courts, for that
matter) are not to have control over the legislature's internal doings.
This principle invests the Rules of Proceedings Clause with constitu-
I note that there is some history in Britain (as here) of passing statutes that
regulate matters touching on privilege, e.g., Parliamentary Privilege Act 10,
1770, Geo. 3, c. 50 (Eng.), but an investigation of British practice regarding statu-
tized rules is beyond the scope of this Article. Such statutes raise substantially
different issues than do statutized rules in the United States: the American privi-
leges derive from a written constitution that is superior to statutes, the separa-
tion-of-powers calculation is fundamentally different given that Britain is a
parliamentary system, etc.
116. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (qualifications for Representatives); id. § 3, cl. 3
(qualifications for Senators); id. § 5, cl. 1 (quorum); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (directing
the House "immediately" to select a president if the electoral votes do not produce
a winner); id. amend. XX, § 2 ("The Congress shall assemble at least once in
every year, and such meeting shall being at noon on the 3d day of January, unless
they shall by law appoint a different day.").
117. See Vermeule, supra note 8. Although the primary aim in this portion of the
Article is not an analysis of optimal institutional design, the discussion also aims
to shed light on why a principle of cameral autonomy is sensible and attractive.
Cf. id. at 430 ("The bare insistence on cameral autonomy-that each house sim-
ply must make rules to govern itself and itself alone-just restates the conclu-
sion, rather than explaining it.").
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tional heft that one might not otherwise glean from its quotidian exte-
rior. In particular, it explains why the clause, which on its face acts as
a permission to set rules unilaterally-" [e] ach House may"-should be
read as a command that no other agency have a veto over a chamber's
rules.
Cameral autonomy is closely related to the separation of powers.
It is of course well known that the Framers believed that a free gov-
ernment must be one in which power was diffused rather than concen-
trated in one person or body. But the great insight of their political
theory was that one could not prevent dangerous combinations of
power merely through the verbal fiat of vesting distinct governmental
powers in different agencies and declaring that no branch should exer-
cise the power of another. Such "parchment barriers" would soon be
overrun unless the government was designed so that each department
"had a will of its own" that would impel it to repel attempted encroach-
ments.1 1 8 Thus the key was institutional psychology-each branch
has incentives, motives, and a will that must remain its own rather
than being corrupted by the influence of others. "If it be essential to
the preservation of liberty that the Legisl[ative], Execut[ive] & Judici-
ary powers be separate," Madison said, "it is essential to a mainte-
nance of the separation, that they should be independent of each
other."119 "Independent" here does not mean simply "apart from" but
rather means not controlled by another, not beholden to another, not
dependent upon another. In other words, autonomous-separate and
self-directing.
Perhaps the single best illustration of the Framers' desire to pre-
serve institutional independence was the insistence on preventing, to
the extent practicable, members of one branch from being beholden to
another for their continuation in office. The topic of whether members
of some parts of the government should be elected by other parts was
one of the most frequent topics of debate at Philadelphia and in The
Federalist and was perceived as absolutely crucial.12o Notably, there
arose the question whether the president should be elected by the leg-
islature. As Madison explained at the Convention:
The Executive could not be independent of the Legislure [sic], if dependent on
the pleasure of that branch for a re-appointment. Why was it determined that
118. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 315 (James Madison) (Bantam Dell 2003). As Profes-
sors Levinson and Pildes point out in an important recent article, the Madisonian
vision of strong institutional allegiances has been much eroded by the growth of
strong political parties. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2312 (2006).
119. 2 RECORDS, supra note 90, at 34 (emphasis added).
120. See Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation" for the Separation of Powers:
The Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 TEx. L. REv. 447, 472-77, 511-21
(1996) (highlighting the centrality of matters such as appointment, tenure, and
salary).
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the Judges should not hold their places by such a tenure? Because they might
be tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by an undue complaisance, and thus
render the Legislature the virtual expositor, as well the maker of the laws. In
like manner a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it
the Executor as well as the maker of laws; & then according to the observation
of Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed in a
tyrannical manner. 1 2 1
A president whose reelection was in the legislature's hands would
be, in a palpable sense, beholden to that body. Officials are dependent
on those who determine their continuation in office. And this servile
dependence, Madison thought, was the path to the tyranny of consoli-
dated authority that the separation of powers hoped to avoid. There-
fore, to ensure that each branch maintained "a will of its own," it was
essential that each "have as little agency as possible in the appoint-
ment of the members of the others."122
The Madisonian worry that the legislature could dominate a presi-
dent it elected was just one manifestation of the Framers' concern over
interbranch dependence. These people were, after all, well familiar
with the abuses perpetrated by domineering executive monarchs and
royal governors. The Constitution accordingly takes numerous steps
to protect legislators' institutional allegiances from executive corrup-
tion, as reflected in a series of otherwise unremarkable pieces of the
text. For example, the Incompatibility Clause forbids members of
Congress from holding positions in other branches.12 3 The rule was
largely a response to the practice of the British monarchs, as well as of
royal governors in the colonies, of holding out highly remunerative of-
fices, pensions, and titles to members of the legislature.124 Under
these corrupting influences, the favored legislators could reliably be
counted upon to rubberstamp the king's proposals. The incompatibil-
ity rule sought to prevent legislators from becoming dependent on the
executive in this way, as The Federalist explained.125
Likewise designed to insulate legislators from domination by the
executive is the Speech or Debate Clause.12 6 This provision, which
results from a history in Britain of monarchs prosecuting opposition
members of Parliament for critical floor speeches, gives legislators
121. 2 RECORDS, supra note 90, at 34.
122. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 118, at 315.
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.").
124. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 78, 171 (2006);
Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of
Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1053-62 (1994)
(describing the historical background of the Incompatibility Clause).
125. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 458-59 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Dell 2003).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (providing that "for any Speech or Debate in either
House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
Place").
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protection from "intimidation by the executive and accountability
before a possibly hostile judiciary."1 2 7 Members are accountable to
their colleagues and to their constituents for what they say in debate,
but the other branches cannot be the master of what happens within
the chamber. Instead, the legislators themselves are empowered and
expected to punish or expel members for bad conduct.12 s
The above bulwarks against executive domination of the legisla-
ture fall rather neatly under the separation of powers label. If legisla-
tors were beholden to the president-whether through the desire for
remunerative offices or the fear of political prosecutions-Congress
would lose its ability to counterbalance the president and eventually
would cease to operate as a truly separate branch of government. In
the plan of the Constitution, Congress truly is the most autonomous
branch. That gets us part of the way to cameral autonomy. The next
step is to see that the principle of non-beholdenness also applies to the
two houses of Congress as separate entities. Whether it is considered
formally part of the separation of powers or not, cameral autonomy is
likewise a critical structural feature of our plan of government.129
The choice between a bicameral and a unicameral legislature im-
plicates several institutional considerations. These include the pros-
pect of more deliberative lawmaking, the goal of protecting minority
interests, and the Madisonian notion that dividing the Congress into
two houses provides a barrier against corruption and faction, as two
bodies are less likely simultaneously to succumb to such forces than
would one. 130 Beyond the general considerations favoring bicamera-
127. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181-82 (1966). Quoting Madison's re-
marks in The Federalist, the Johnson court explains that "[t]he legislative privi-
lege, protecting against possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and
conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one manifestation of the 'practical security' for
ensuring the independence of the legislature." Id. at 179. For a discussion of the
British background of the debate privilege, see CHAFETZ, supra note 35, ch. 3.
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
129. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 395 (1990) ("Provisions for the
separation of powers within the Legislative Branch are thus not different in kind
from provisions concerning relations between the branches; both sets of provi-
sions safeguard liberty."); see also James E. Castello, Comment, The Limits of
Popular Sovereignty: Using the Inititative Power to Control Legislative Procedure,
74 CAL. L. REV. 491, 533-47 (1986) (discussing relationship between legislative
procedure and separation of powers).
130. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 118, at 316-18;
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 62, 79, at 378-79 (James Madison) (Bantam Dell 2003);
No. 64 (John Jay), No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton). Here I should reiterate my ear-
lier comments, supra text accompanying notes 115-17, to the effect that much in
the Constitution is explained by practical compromise rather than by theoretical
ideals. Bicameralism in particular is partly the result of small states' insistence
that the states play an important role in the new government. But the bicameral
arrangement that was chosen nonetheless reflects and embodies various other
political values, apart from the motives of any particular participant. I note that
the Senate initially represented the states through their state legislatures and
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lism, the Senate was intended to have a special role and character.
With longer terms in office, senators could be expected to take a
longer-term view of things than could members of the House.131
But of course to maintain bicameralism it was not enough to divide
through parchment barriers. As before, the key to separateness was
independence-that is, non-beholdenness. If the House elected the
Senate, the two bodies would remain formally separate, but the Sen-
ate would lose most of its autonomy.13 2 The Virginia Plan presented
at the Constitutional Convention had originally proposed such an ar-
rangement, 13 3 but delegates rejected it. As more than one explained,
"it would make [the senators] too dependent, and thereby destroy the
end for which the Senate ought to be appointed."' 34 Autonomy is not
just separateness but also practical self-governance. Consistent with
Madison's view that each department of government should have an
independent "will of its own," he also believed that each house of Con-
gress should be "as little connected with each other as the nature of
their common functions and their common dependence on the society
will admit." 135
Given that goal, it is therefore unsurprising that the Constitution
contains repeated affirmations of each chamber's sovereignty over its
own internal affairs. It provides that each house shall be "the Judge
of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." 13 6
This decision obviously creates a risk of self-dealing and partisan op-
portunism,13 7 but evidently that risk was thought better than the al-
ternatives of vesting the power elsewhere; indeed, the British
Commons had for the preceding several centuries been fighting to
keep the king and his courts out of such disputes.138 Commenting on
the clause, Joseph Story pointed out the dangerous consequences of
putting the power outside the legislature: "If [the powers were] lodged
in any other [body] than the legislative body itself, its independence,
its purity, and even its existence and action may be destroyed, or put
into imminent danger. No other body, but itself, can have the same
motives to preserve and perpetuate these attributes ... ."139 For simi-
lar reasons, members of Congress are not subject to impeachment by
now, after the Seventeenth Amendment, represents the states through their peo-
ple. But this does not affect the cameral autonomy arguments presented here.
131. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 391-92 (John Jay) (Bantam Dell 2003).
132. See Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 760-64
(1999) (posing this thought experiment).
133. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 90, at 20.
134. 1 id. at 59 (remarks of Roger Sherman); see also 1 id. (remarks of George Mason);
1 id. at 52 (remarks of James Wilson).
135. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 118, at 316.
136. U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 1.
137. See Vermeule, supra note 8, at 393-94.
138. 1 HAYNES, supra note 85, at 121; CHAFETZ, supra note 35, at 69-70.
139. 2 STORY, supra note 111, § 831.
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the House with trial in the Senate; rather, each chamber disciplines
and expels its own members. 140 Further illustrating each chamber's
powers of self-government, each house is empowered to compel attend-
ance of absent members to ensure a functioning quorum.' 4 ' And as
discussed earlier, each chamber has also been held to possess the in-
herent authority to protect itself through the contempt power. Came-
ral autonomy is the common theme of all of these bits of text.142
As noted above, there are some portions of the Constitution that
deviate from a rule of strict cameral independence. Neither house can
adjourn for more than three days without the consent of the other, the
president can adjourn them when they cannot agree on a time to ad-
journ, and he can convene either or both houses "on extraordinary oc-
casions."143 To some extent such rules simply reflect necessity: proper
operation of a bicameral body requires some method for coordination
between the two houses regarding calendars; if the legislature was not
expected to be in session year-round, then exigent circumstances
might require the president to summon it; and so on. 144 Importantly,
compared to British practice, the Constitution's rules represent a
strong repudiation of executive control. The president lacks the mon-
arch's unilateral power to prorogue or dissolve the legislature against
its will,145 and, apart from the president's aforementioned
"tiebreaker" opportunity (the need for which has never arisen), deci-
sions regarding adjournment are specifically exempted from present-
140. U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 2. I recognize that the proposition that members of
Congress are not subject to impeachment has not always been completely free
from doubt. Early in the nation's history the House impeached Senator William
Blount, but the Senate dismissed the articles of impeachment. Although the Sen-
ate's action did not necessarily reflect the view that legislators are not impeacha-
ble officers, the incident has come to stand for that view (which is, I believe, also
the best textual position). See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACH-
MENT PROCESS 47-50 (2d ed. 2000); 2 STORY, supra note 111, § 791. See generally
BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE FIRST IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTION'S FRAMERS
AND THE CASE OF SENATOR WILLIAM BLOUNT (1998).
141. U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 1.
142. I note that starting with the early Congresses and for many years thereafter, the
two houses followed joint rules governing certain matters of procedure touching
upon both of them. This is no precedent against cameral autonomy, however, as
long as the joint rules existed only with the consent of both houses. The joint
rules were in fact abrogated unilaterally in 1876. JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, supra
note 7, at 28; HINDS, supra note 73, § 6782.
143. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 4; id. art. 2, § 3.
144. On the perceived necessity of such deviations from strict cameral autonomy, see,
for example, 3 RECORDS, supra note 90, at 312; AMAR, supra note 124, at 132.
145. On the Crown's authority in this regard, see, for example, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL,
supra note 7, § 588, at 306; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 179-80; cf. THE
FEDERALIST No. 69, at 419 (Alexander Hamilton) (contrasting the president's and
the monarch's power).
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ment to the president.146 Cameral autonomy remains the background
rule, even if it is not absolute.
Even less a real and substantial departure from autonomy is the
fact that although the Senate chooses its other officers itself, the Con-
stitution designates the vice president the Senate's presiding of-
ficer.14 7 Some delegates at the Philadelphia Convention feared that
this would give the executive branch too much power over the Senate.
But others explained that this fear was misplaced because, given the
Constitution's method of separately selecting the president and vice
president, the two officers would be expected to be rivals.148 In any
event, although the officers have today become allied in light of party-
ticket selection, the Senate has not allowed the vice president to con-
trol its proceedings. 14 9
The portions of the Constitution discussed in this section provide a
backdrop for understanding the structural role of the Rules of Pro-
ceedings Clause. At the risk of overstating matters, the history shows
that the clause has a bit of republican spark to it. It responds to pal-
pable risks of executive overreaching, no less than does the Speech or
Debate Clause. It is not just a housekeeping measure but rather is
part and parcel of an emergent principle of cameral self-government
that, while nowhere set out in so many words, nonetheless permeates
Article I. Together with the other aspects of cameral autonomy can-
vassed above, it is constitutive of each chamber's independence. And
that independence, we have seen, was in the Framers' eyes indispen-
sable to the separateness that was to prevent tyrannical agglomera-
tions of power and preserve the people's freedom.
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (exempting adjournment resolutions from present-
ment); CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 29-30 & n.35
(1989) (noting that the president has never had occasion to use his tiebreaker
power). For a different interpretation of that clause, see Seth Barrett Tillman, A
Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia
Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1265, 1347-49 (2005).
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 4-5.
148. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 90, at 537 (remarks of G. Morris to the effect that the
objection assumed that "[tihe vice president then will be the first heir apparent
that ever loved his father"); see also Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents,
28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 312 (1999) (making the same point in explaining why
the chief justice, and not the vice president, presides over impeachment trials of
the president).
149. One notable power of the vice president is to make parliamentary rulings when
sitting as the chair; however, such rulings are appealable to the whole Senate
and are overruled unless supported by a majority. RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note
85, at 145, 148; see also id. at 1026 (stating that the vice president must follow
Senate rules and "has no rulemaking power over the Senate").
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Finally, it should be noted that one could concede the importance of
cameral autonomy as a general matter but contend that the Senate's
procedural autonomy is necessarily impaired in the particular case of
appointments.150 There, the president has powers and interests at
stake as well. Indeed, the Senate's rules and practices have long dis-
tinguished between executive business (that is, treaties and appoint-
ments) and ordinary legislative business. 151 The different rules date
back to the First Congress, during which the Senate appointed a com-
mittee to consult with the president on what procedures to employ
when the Senate considered nominations and treaties. 15 2 President
Washington seems to have been somewhat unsure how to respond to
the Senate's inquiry. His papers reflect that on August 8, 1789, he
told the committee that he thought that treaties probably required
oral, in-person communications (but that he was unsure where the
president and Senate should meet to confer) and that appointments
could best be handled solely through writing.15 3 In connection with
the latter, he observed:
[I]t could be no pleasing thing I conceive, for the President, on the one hand to
be present and hear the propriety of his nominations questioned - nor for the
Senate on the other hand to be under the smallest restraint by his presence
from the fullest and freest enquiry into the Character of the Person
nominated. 1 5 4
Two days later he set forth a somewhat more aggressive view that
analogized the Senate's role to that of the British monarch's Privy
Council, stating that "[tihe Senate when [executive] powers are exer-
cised, is evidently a Council only to the President" and that the time,
place, and manner of consultation should be up to the president as he
may prefer on any given occasion. 15 5 Regarding appointments in par-
ticular, he believed that "the agency of the Senate is purely executive,
and they may be summoned to the President."156 The Senate soon
passed a resolution providing that the president's nominations could
be tendered to the Senate either in writing or in person and, if in per-
son, the Senate would meet with the president either in the Senate
chamber or in other locations; the rules also laid out several procedu-
ral formalities to be followed in executive sessions.15 7 The possibility
that the president might summon the Senate for an executive session
naturally raises the question whether the Senate can be "master in its
150. I thank Larry Solum for bringing this objection to my attention.
151. See, e.g., RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 85, at 832-34. The current provisions of
the Senate rules governing executive sessions are SEN. RULES XXIX-XXXI.
152. See 1 HAYNES, supra note 85, at 52-68.
153. 3 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 400-01 (W.W. Abbot &
Dorothy Twohig eds. 1989).
154. Id. at 401.
155. Id. at 408-09.
156. Id. at 409.
157. Id. at 402-03; S. Exec. J. 19 (Aug. 21, 1789).
2007] 1005
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
own house" in matters of procedure when it may be meeting, quite
literally, in the president's house.
What are we to make of this August 1789 discussion of the proce-
dure for appointments? Its import is contestable, because it is not
clear to what degree each side should be read as making, and respond-
ing to, assertions of constitutional right rather than seeking to accom-
modate the other.158 But there is other historical context that is
relevant here, and it tends not to support diminished senatorial au-
tonomy. President Washington never actually met the Senate in per-
son or summoned them to his residence to present and seek consent on
a nomination, but he instead submitted nominations in writing, which
the Senate then took up in due course when it deemed it proper.15 9
Moreover, even the power to convene a personal meeting with the Sen-
ate does not equate to a power to dictate the manner and timing of
giving advice and consent. This point is illustrated by the one occa-
sion on which Washington personally visited the Senate to discuss a
proposed treaty.160 The Senate was read certain papers concerning
the treaty and then several questions were put to it for a vote, Wash-
ington evidently expecting that the Senate would give him its answer
then and there. Several senators objected to this method, and the
Senate resolved to turn the treaty over to a committee to consider the
matter more fully-this despite the argument of one senator that a
body acting as an executive council could not refer matters to commit-
tees. Washington then departed, apparently in a state of some agita-
tion at the Senate's conduct, and thereafter communicated exclusively
in writing regarding treaties. 161 While nothing like a full-fledged con-
stitutional debate over who controls procedure, this clash does present
158. For further discussion of the meaning of this episode, see Posting of Lawrence
Solum to the Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2003/11
the-presidents_.html (Nov. 17, 2003, 07:16 PDT); Posting of Michael Rappaport
to the Right Coast, http://therightcoast.blogspot.com/2003/ll/formalism-and-sen-
ates-power-not-to.html (Nov. 17, 2003, 12:56 EDT); and previous posts cited
therein. Professor Currie believes that the lesson of the First Congress' promul-
gation of the rules governing nominations shows that "the Senators insisted on
asserting their independence: if the president elected to seek their advice in per-
son, they were determined not to lose control of the proceeding." Currie, supra
note 9, at 182. I note that a modern reader might overestimate the extent to
which the Senate's willingness to go to the president signals subordination to the
executive. The eighteenth-century parliamentary mind could still recall Charles
I's notorious incursion into the House of Commons and similar events involving
colonial governors. See MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN
THE AMERICAN COLONIES 227-28 (1943). Some legislators might have preferred
waiting upon the president to having him enter the chamber.
159. 1 HAYNES, supra note 85, at 56.
160. See 1 id. at 62-68 (describing this incident); THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY
124-30 (Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. 1965) (1890) (same).
161. 1 HAYNES, supra note 85, at 67-69.
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powerful evidence that the president does not today possess a dormant
power to control the Senate's proceedings in executive session.
In sum, while action on executive business was generally (though
not always) much quicker in past ages than it is today,162 it seems
that the Senate has, at least as a matter of fact, consistently exercised
control over the timing and parliamentary rules under which it would
give its consent. Thus, despite a reasonable argument for diminished
cameral autonomy in the case of executive business, historical prac-
tice-not to mention the practical and structural argument offered
earlier-on balance supports Senate control over procedure. (And, in
any event, a presidential role in confirmation procedure could not vali-
date statutized procedures, which bring in the House as well.)
D. Applying Cameral Autonomy
Now that the Rules of Proceedings Clause has been invested with
some structural content, it is time to step back from theory and see
how we can apply these insights to the analysis of the judicial confir-
mations statute.
If the judicial confirmations statute were binding as a normal stat-
ute usually is, it could be changed only by amending the statute
through the same Article I, Section 7 process that created it. The Sen-
ate would be unable to change its rules by itself. The key feature of
the judicial confirmations statute, then, is that it gives the president,
and the House of Representatives, a say over the Senate's rules of pro-
ceedings. That is a subject that, under the cameral autonomy princi-
ple that emerges from the various bits of constitutional text discussed
above, these two entities have no legitimate business controlling. We
have found, then, the reason why the confirmations statute cannot
bind the houses of Congress
The Senate's inability to control its own proceedings is not just
damaging to its autonomy in some metaphysical sense but would have
important real-world consequences. As noted above in section V.B.,
the president's control over the Senate's business would allow him to
upset the Senate's consideration of other legislative priorities. Speak-
ing in more general terms, it would transfer away a measure of the
Senate's agenda power. Common sense and political research tell us
that matters such as the timing and circumstances under which a leg-
islature considers proposals can have profound impacts on legislative
162. Senate rules have for well over a hundred years contained provisions governing
what is to happen to nominations that the Senate has neither accepted nor re-
jected by the end of a session, and so delay in considering nominations is not new.
See S. J. 345 (Mar. 25, 1868); see also Gerhardt, supra note 96, at 459 ("Just as
the Constitution does not dictate how fast the president must act in making
nominations, it does not direct how quickly the Senate must act in approving or
disapproving presidential nominations.").
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outcomes. Indeed, key findings from the positive theory of political
institutions confirm that apparent trivialities such as the sequence of
consideration can be outcome determinative-not just in theory but
under circumstances that are likely to be present in actual legisla-
tures.16 3 The Rules of Proceedings Clause stands for the proposition
that this crucial agenda power rests with each chamber.
The upshot of the structurally infused reading of the Rules of Pro-
ceedings Clause is that a judicial confirmations statute could not bind
in the way statutes characteristically do. The statute may be within
Congress' Article I powers to enact-and the Senate could certainly
choose to follow the procedures if it liked-but if the Senate later
wished to depart from the statutized rules unilaterally, it would have
the power to do so. Any other result would confer on the president
(and the House) a portion of the Senate's agenda power. The rulemak-
ing power is of a piece with neighboring constitutional clauses that
together constitute the chamber's independence, and this cession of
authority is no more legitimate than letting the president judge sena-
tors' elections or expel them from their seats.
How far does this principle of cameral autonomy reach, and how
much legislation would it touch? Leaving aside legislation that actu-
ally regulates the rules of debate (like the judicial confirmations stat-
ute would), there are other types of legislation that also relate to
unicameral powers. Not all of it is problematic. The Supreme Court
case of Burton v. United States'6 4 provides a good illustration of the
type of inquiry that is required. Recall that the same sentence in the
Constitution that contains the Rules of Proceedings Clause also pro-
vides that "[elach House" may punish and expel members. 165 In Bur-
ton, the Court considered a senator's constitutional challenge to a
statute making it a crime for government officers, including senators,
to receive payment for representing an individual before a government
agency. Certainly the Senate could pass an internal rule prohibiting
senators from engaging in such representation. The Court agreed
with Senator Burton that the Constitution would countenance no in-
terference with the Senate's powers over its members, but it nonethe-
less affirmed Congress' power to pass the statute:
163. There is a vast literature on this topic. On the basic theory, see, for example,
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS 49-81 (1997).
For a review of the literature on the effects of parliamentary rules, see, for exam-
ple, Gary W. Cox, On the Effects of Legislative Rules, in LEGISLATURES: COMPARA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVES ON REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES 247 (Gerhard Loewenberg et
al. eds., 2002). For real world examples, see WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF PO-
LITICAL MANIPULATION 10-17, 34-51, 106-28 (1986); and John C. Blydenburgh,
The Closed Rule and the Paradox of Voting, 33 J. POL. 57, 62-67 (1971).
164. 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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While the framers of the Constitution intended that each Department should
keep within its appointed sphere of public action, it was never contemplated
that the authority of the Senate to admit to a seat in its body one who had
been duly elected as a Senator, or its power to expel him after being admitted,
should, in any degree, limit or restrict the authority of Congress to enact such
statutes, not forbidden by the Constitution, as the public interests required
for carrying into effect the powers granted to it.
1 6 6
Thus, in the Burton Court's view, each chamber's unilateral au-
thority to police its membership does not mean that Congress cannot
pass criminal statutes that also regulate its members' conduct. 16 7
The key to the Court's holding that the statute did not interfere with
the Senate's unilateral powers, however, was its conclusion that (de-
spite some suggestion in the text of the statute) the criminal convic-
tion "did not operate, ipso facto, to vacate the seat of the convicted
Senator, nor compel the Senate to expel him or to regard him as ex-
pelled by force alone of the judgment."168 In other words, the statute
did not itself expel Burton upon conviction-something that can be
accomplished only by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. If the statute
had purported to have that effect, there is every reason to think it
would have been struck down. As a result, Burton affirms the power
to pass statutes that touch matters that could be regulated by rule,
but it also shows that such statutes must not be allowed to actually
interfere with a chamber's prerogatives. So here also, the vice is not
the statute regarding unilateral powers per se; instead, the problem is
the interference with autonomy that some such statutes in some cir-
cumstances create.
A final example, from early in our nation's history, marks out a
similar boundary. As alluded to above, election contests had been a
source of recurring troubles in the early years and they of course
presented ripe opportunities for partisan opportunism. In 1797, Rep-
resentative Robert Harper introduced a simple resolution (not a bill)
establishing procedures to govern future election contests. The resolu-
tion required disappointed challengers to give timely notice that they
planned to contest an election, provided methods by which the party
bringing the contest could secure testimony before courts in the dis-
trict where the election occurred, and stated that the House would not
entertain evidence taken in any other way. 16 9 Representative Samuel
Sitgreaves objected that no House could purport to pass a rule that
applied in a later Congress; a statute would be required to achieve
166. Burton, 202 U.S. at 367-68.
167. Likewise, though each house has the unilateral power to punish outsiders for
contempts, Congress may also create a statute that makes contempt a crime pun-
ishable in the courts through criminal prosecution, for the statute does not pre-
vent each house from using the unilateral power. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S.
661, 671-72 (1897).
168. Burton, 202 U.S. at 367.
169. 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 682-83 (1797).
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that enduring effect, he believed. But, he continued, such a statute
would be objectionable-not because of the anti-entrenchment norm,
notably, but because the statute "would give to the President and Sen-
ate a power over the rules for governing [the House's] proceedings,
which, by the Constitution, they were alone the judges of."170 What
he described, of course, is the principle of cameral autonomy described
above.
Harper then agreed with Sitgreaves that "it would be unconstitu-
tional for the President or Senate to interfere with [the House's] rules
or elections."17l Apparently modifying his original proposal, he then
contended that there could be no objection to a statute that merely
created compulsory process for gathering evidence, for that statute
would not bear upon the House's judging of the evidence.1 72 The mat-
ter was referred to a committee for further consideration,173 and even-
tually the committee produced a bill that lacked the problematic
features of the original proposal; the bill passed. Notably, the result-
ing statute did not provide deadlines for giving notice of election con-
tests, nor did it purport to limit the types of evidence the House could
consider-both of which could rightly be thought to trench upon the
House's rights to govern its own proceedings and be the judge of its
own members' elections. Instead, the statute merely created a method
of locally securing evidence that could be used in an election contest in
the House, namely by authorizing judges within the district to issue
process and take evidence, prescribing penalties for failure to appear
at such hearings, and providing reimbursement for witnesses.' 7 4
Even though these matters relate to the unilateral power over election
contests, such provisions cannot be thought to interfere with each
house's unilateral prerogatives. Rather, the resulting statute seems
like an excellent example of the kind of statute that is an appropriate
method of exercising that power.
In sum, the Constitution does not forbid Congress from passing
statutes that bear on matters of internal governance. No such statute,
however, can be permitted to interfere with each chamber's unilateral
powers, such as by giving the president or the other chamber a veto
over changing parliamentary rules. Thus, as a matter of constitu-
tional law, the Senate would retain unilateral control over its confir-
mation procedures regardless of what any statute may say.
While this is the end of the legal analysis, it is not the end of the
story. Having seen why the statute cannot bind, we will now conclude
on a more practical note by seeing how it might work nonetheless.
170. Id. at 683-84.
171. Id. at 684.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 687.
174. Act of Jan. 23, 1798, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 537.
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VI. HOW THE STATUTE COULD WORK IN PRACTICE
The analysis presented above shows that a confirmations statute
could not, as a matter of constitutional law, be legally binding. But it
would be a serious mistake to overlook (as lawyers sometimes do) the
fact that legal mandates are not the only things that matter, or even
necessarily the most important things. Despite all of the above, the
confirmations statute could have a practical effect whether or not it
would be enforceable in a court and even whether or not it legally
binds the Senate. It could be politically binding even if not legally
binding.17 5
The confirmations statute resembles certain other statutory re-
gimes in this regard. Comments by former Speaker of the House
Thomas Reed are instructive here. In 1890, discussing statutes gov-
erning election contests, Reed said:
We could not divest ourselves of our right to be the judges of elections even if
we would, nor would any statute enacted by both houses serve the purpose.
The election laws which we now have do not bind us except by our own con-
sent. Yet in practice they do bind us .... 176
Over time, the statutory confirmation procedure could come to pos-
sess legitimacy as a fair, prearranged method for handling nomina-
tions. And even if it had not attained that amount of acceptance
among legislators, a vote to violate the confirmations statute would be
a politically salient event, and flouting the norm clearly spelled out in
the United States Code could be politically costly. The president can
be counted upon to harangue legislators for breaking their own com-
mitments and changing the rules of the game if they ignore the stat-
ute. 17 7 At the same time, the existence of the statutory norm would
also provide political cover for legislators who, for political reasons,
could not admit that they agree with the result the statute would
175. Cf. Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,45 KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1163-68, 1173-74
(1997) (arguing that the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act's procedural require-
ments can have a significant political effect even though they are legally waiv-
able); James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially
Unenforceable Rules that Combine with Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to
Regulate Political Behavior, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 645 (1992).
176. T.B. Reed, Contested Elections, N. Am. REV., July 1890, at 112-20, quoted in 1
HAYNES, supra note 85, at 122 n.2.
177. See Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Consti-
tution's Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215, 227 (1995) (making similar point in
connection with statutes governing congressional counting of electoral votes); see
also Garrett, Purposes, supra note 8, at 750-53 (discussing political costs of vio-
lating framework laws); Frederick Schauer, Legislators as Rule-Followers, in THE
LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH, supra note 8, at 468 (describing internal enforcement
devices for legislative norms and rules).
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bring about.178 There are thus multiple mechanisms by which the
Senate might comply with the statutory procedures.
Since Congress has passed a number of similar statutes in other
policy areas in the past, it has a track record that one can examine.
Congress has on a number of occasions expressed its view that it is
entitled to ignore statutized rules, and it has in fact sometimes done
so. 179 But those may well be exceptions rather than the rule. One of
the most important regimes of statutized rules, the fast track system
for trade agreements, in fact has a strong record of compliance. As
Congress proudly stated when it reauthorized fast track several years
ago, "neither House has ever acted unilaterally to withdraw applica-
tion of fast track procedures."SO It has followed the fast track proce-
dures despite its awareness of the disclaimer clause that explicitly
allows either house to abolish those special procedures. In the most
recent big test of fast track, the vote on the Central American Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the Senate did not filibuster the imple-
menting bill even though the vote was close and some senators fiercely
opposed passage. Likewise, some statutized rules in the budget pro-
cess have also proven quite powerful; indeed, President Bush's mas-
sive 2001 tax cut, a highly controversial measure supported by only
the barest majority of senators, probably would not have passed in
anything like its actual form had the Senate not adhered to special
streamlined procedures.1S1 While there is no way to know for sure
that the statutized rules made the difference in these cases, both
pieces of legislation certainly look like the types of high-stakes, con-
tentious measures that in the modern Congress can usually succeed
only with supermajority support.
Finally, one should not overlook the role of simple partisan advan-
tage in bringing about compliance. The minority's ability to prolong
debate is always, in the end, a product of the majority's sufferance; if
push really comes to shove, the majority can work its will. If there is a
statute purporting to eliminate the filibuster for judicial nominations,
178. In the trade context, imagine for instance a Democrat from a Rust Belt state who
is a free-trader at heart but dare not say that to her constituents. Interested
constituents demand that she filibuster or amend a trade pact, but the legislator
responds that, while she deeply wants to do so, the fast track statute unfortu-
nately has tied her hands. A similar dynamic could be at play for a quietly pro-
life Democrat under pressure to filibuster a judge that opposes Roe v. Wade, who
could then cite the statute as a basis for not doing so. Such an explanation might
succeed quite apart from whether the statute really is binding as a legal matter.
179. See Bruhl, supra note 8, at 366-70.
180. S. REP. No. 107-139, at 54 (2002).
181. See Tiefer, supra note 8, at 427 (stating that "regular procedures, which require a
Senate consensus rather than a bare majority for controversial measures, would
have compelled the tax bill to undergo major changes, if not a complete overhaul,
in order to garner the votes necessary to pass the Senate"); see also id. at 433-41;
Roberts, supra note 35, at 518-19.
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that would certainly stiffen the majority's resolve to close debate, and
the statute would also provide a legal justification for doing so. This
factor is especially important in situations where the president's party
enjoys a slim, non-filibuster-proof majority in the Senate. For exam-
ple, if there existed such a statute during the contentious period from
2003 to 2005, there is a very good chance that Republicans would have
stood upon the statute and used it as grounds for quashing any at-
tempted Democratic filibusters of the Republican president's nomi-
nees. (And, moreover, some Democratic senators not inclined to
filibuster could cynically cite the statute in deflecting constituents'
calls for a more aggressive posture.) In that way, the statute would
most certainly "work" even if nobody did or could go to court to enforce
it-and even if the statute were not really binding.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has considered whether a statute is a proper method
for addressing what some perceive as a broken confirmation process.
Such a statute would have a number of attractions for reformers, but
its virtues end up being its vice: The statutory form, just by virtue of
being statutory, holds out the possibility of greater durability, clarity,
and legitimacy than the current status quo, but the statutory form
also gives the president and the House a say over Senate procedures.
As explained in Part V, an intrusion into the Senate's rules power
is impermissible even though the president already plays a predomi-
nant role in the appointments process. The problem is not that the
statute makes it easier for the president to nominate and secure con-
firmation of candidates that match the president's preferences. Un-
like other fast track regimes, which concern types of legislation rather
than the special context of appointments, the judicial fast track would
not rearrange the steps in the constitutional decisionmaking process.
In fact, although much of this Article has discussed statutes that
would streamline the confirmation process and benefit the executive,
the statutory form is itself content neutral and could also establish
procedures that are unfriendly to the president-such as a require-
ment that sixty-five votes are needed for cloture. But that president-
unfriendly statute would still offend the principle of cameral auton-
omy. Thus, the analysis of the confirmations statute set forth in this
Article serves to emphasize that the problem lies not with any shift in
policy outcomes but instead lies with the statutory method itself.
None of this should be taken to mean that reformers should write
off a judicial confirmations statute altogether. This Article has ex-
plained why the statute could not be binding as a matter of constitu-
tional law. But as discussed above, Congress has passed dozens of
framework laws and other statutized rules, and these statutes typi-
cally contain language-plain as day, laid bare for all to see-admit-
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ting that each house reserves the right to change those statutized
rules just like any other rule.' 8 2 As I have explained, that disclaimer
language states what is the case as a matter of constitutional law, and
the principle of cameral autonomy is the reason why the statute can-
not prevent the Senate from governing its own procedures. Thus, if
the statute were passed and the Senate later refused to follow the pro-
cedures, it would be within its constitutional rights in doing so. (And,
even if the Senate's refusal were illegal, it may well be able to succeed
without any judicial interference.)
Yet presumably there is some reason why Congress bothers to en-
act such laws and why presidents sign them. And, of course, there is:
They mostly work. They are symbolic, true, but they are not only sym-
bolic. Even if they can be changed unilaterally or even just ignored,
the statutized procedure serves as a focal point. In the hands of those
who would benefit from following the special statutory procedures, the
statute is a cudgel with which to batter or shame opponents into fol-
lowing the prearranged ground rules. It also provides legislators with
a justification for following procedures they otherwise might not be
able to publicly embrace. These are certainly important effects, and in
practice they may be determinative. But if we are to have such a stat-
ute, we should at least be clear that to the extent it is treated as bind-
ing, it is only because the Senate wills it to be so.
182. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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